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ABSTRACT 
 Increasing economic power has driven China’s global rise, providing China with 
immense influence and capabilities. China has used this power in pursuit of its strategic 
objectives especially in the Indo-Pacific. How has Chinese economic statecraft and 
coercion impacted South Korea’s and Australia’s security relations with the United 
States? This thesis conducts comparative case studies of South Korea and Australia and 
their economic relations with China and security relations with the United States. This 
research made use of multiple databases to examine 20 years’ worth of records detailing 
bilateral relations and trade for instances of Chinese economic coercion to identify the 
core cases, and makes shorter assessments of other key cases. This thesis finds that China 
primarily uses informal economic coercive methods for a range of issues including 
territorial maritime disputes, human rights, and security interests. The tactics have 
become more active and sophisticated over time in being able to precisely and flexibly 
target industries. However, China’s use of economic coercion has so far achieved mixed 
results as there seem to be no long-term concrete changes to the U.S. alliances and, in 
some cases, evidence that it has backfired. This thesis recommends that the United States 
increase its cooperation and establish new institutions with its allies, other countries and 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
How does Chinese economic coercion impact South Korea’s and Australia’s 
security relations with the United States? Both Australia and the Republic of Korea (ROK) 
are robust democracies, advanced free market economies with highly educated populaces, 
and historically have had deep security arrangements with the United States. Both 
countries’ strategic goals and economies are closely aligned and integrated with those of 
the United States. However, in the past few decades China has become both Australia’s 
and ROK’s most important economic partner. The large Chinese market is highly lucrative 
and important for Australian and Korean exports and services. This thesis investigates how 
China has used this new phenomenon for economic coercion directed against the U.S.-
Australia and the U.S.-ROK strategic relationship. 
China has reemerged as major global player that possesses immense economic 
power and influence. After a hundred years of being exploited and territorially carved up 
by foreign powers, and decades of failed socio-economic policies carried out by the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China reopened its economy and diplomatic relations 
with the world with help from the United States. Since President Richard Nixon’s 
engagement with Mao Zedong in 1972 and the official establishment of Sino-U.S. 
diplomatic relations in 1979, China has experienced immense economic growth and 
development. Hundreds of millions of Chinese were taken out of poverty over the course 
of a generation. In 2010, China overtook Japan as the world’s second-largest economy. 
China is projected to surpass the U.S. economy in the future, and by some measures, it 
already has. 
The Chinese economy has grown to become a central player of the world’s 
economy. Known as the world’s factory, production of goods and an export-oriented 
economy drove Chinese economic development. The Chinese economy is heavily 
integrated with other nations in a significantly globalized world. With a population of about 
1.4 billion and an expanding middle class, China has become an attractive and lucrative 
2 
market for other countries’ goods and services. However, foreign states and companies 
looking to do business in China are required to comply with Chinese laws and regulations 
that have been established and upheld by the CCP. Many of these laws are designed with 
the intent of preserving and advancing the CCP and China’s power. China’s shift from 
being primarily an export-oriented economy to domestic-consumption, and striving to 
become a leader in technology and innovation, will further challenge the dynamics in 
economic relations.  
China is on a path to greater status, leadership and involvement in world affairs. In 
2012, when Chinese President Xi Jinping took office he highlighted themes about the 
“Great National Rejuvenation” and achieving the “Chinese Dream.” Making China great 
again requires the advancement of core CCP interests which are continuing China’s 
economic development, maintaining internal stability and preserving its territorial 
sovereignty.1 Senior Chinese leadership up to President Xi have determined that using 
economic coercion will be a part of its strategy to pursue and protect its core interests 
abroad.2 Additionally, China has increased its economic influence by not only increasing 
its presence in current multilateral economic institutions (World Trade Organization, 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, etc.), but also by establishing and becoming a 
central player in regional institutions (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership, Belt Road Initiative, etc.). No country in the world 
can ignore or completely separate itself from China’s economy. Thus, understanding more 
about how and why China uses its newfound tools of statecraft is valuable. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
One may question the relevance of the sphere of economics to the field of national 
security affairs. Entering in an era of Great Power Competition (GPC), it is important to 
understand how strategic and defense efforts can be impacted by all levers of state power–
 
1 Fergus Hanson, Emilia Currey, and Tracy Beattie, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Coercive 
Diplomacy,” Policy Brief (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020), 4, 
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/chinese-communist-partys-coercive-diplomacy. 
2 Peter Harrell, Elisabeth Rosenberg, and Edoardo Sarvalle, “China’s Use of Coercive Economic 
Measures” (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2018). 
3 
including economic ones. Economic interdependence has improved state economies 
around the world, especially in the Asia-Pacific. However, economic relationships might 
be strained in an era of GPC as states look to challenge and compete with each other in 
order to protect and advance their interests. 
China and the United States have entered a GPC era that is especially centered 
around the Asia-Pacific region. In 2011, President Obama spoke at the Australian 
Parliament and set of which is now deemed as the U.S. Pivot to Asia, “as a Pacific nation, 
the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, 
by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and friends.”3 The 
United States has historically enjoyed dominance in the region with its immense military, 
economic, diplomatic and informational power. The recent rise of China in the past  
40 years has presented a challenge to U.S. dominancy especially in regard to influencing 
regional states. In the past and currently, China has been using its greatest instrument of 
national power–economic power–to increasingly challenge the strength of U.S. security 
partnerships. 
Australia and ROK will be important U.S. partners going forward in the GPC era, 
and are vital in Washington’s effort toward a free and open Indo-Pacific. Both countries 
are facing the challenge of balancing their security and economic priorities. Australian and 
South Korean policy makers, scholars, and commercial actors see China as critical to the 
growth and well-being of their economies, while they also see the United States as critical 
to their nation’s security. A rising China is expected to use its growing power and economic 
clout to pursue its strategic goals and development. Information derived from the research 
will inform U.S. policy makers, scholars, and the broader security community about what 
future challenges and opportunities will there be for U.S. engagement.  
U.S. security commitments to Australia and ROK have been important drivers and 
foundations for its defense policy and engagement in the Asia-Pacific. In the past, it was 
the threat of communism during the Cold War that brought the United States together with 
 
3 The White House, “Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” whitehouse.gov, 
November 17, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-
obama-australian-parliament. 
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these countries. Since the Korean War began 1950, the United States and ROK have been 
treaty allies. Tens of thousands of U.S. forces still remain on the Korean Peninsula working 
alongside with ROK forces to watch over and prepare for threats from the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Farther south, since the establishment of the ANZUS 
Treaty in 1951, the United States and Australia have committed to each other’s defense. 
Australia has fought with the United States in every major conflict since 1917. Both 
countries are members of the FIVE EYES group which encompasses close-intelligence 
sharing ties and efforts among the countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United 
Kingdom, and United States.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a great deal of literature and news articles about Chinese economic power 
and statecraft impacting Australia and ROK’s foreign and domestic policies. Recent 
developments and news sources continue to highlight complex interactions between the 
countries. However, there has not been an in-depth study to compare the two countries’ 
experiences with a rising China. The two countries, both important partners of the United 
States, face common challenges of balancing across their national security and economic 
priorities. The differences between the two countries—geospatial distance from China, 
culture, demographics—provide an opportunity to understand what factors influence how 
countries respond to these challenges. 
The thesis’ literature review will follow in five categories. First, the review will go 
over international relations theory and current scholarly work about the impact of economic 
relations between countries. Liberal theory, and more specifically theories of economic 
interdependence (EI), will be touched on to assess prior scholars’ application of it in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Second, what are the concepts economic statecraft and coercion and 
how are they applied to states pursuing their strategic goals?  EI usually increases 
prosperity and amity between countries, but it can also give a state more economic options 
for leverage. Third, there will be a more specific overview of Chinese economic statecraft 
and coercion. How China has used economic statecraft, primarily in the Asia-Pacific, to 
pursue its strategic goals. Fourth, the review will go into case studies and literature focusing 
5 
on ROK to examine how China has impacted ROK’s security relations with the United 
States. Finally, case studies and literature focusing on Australia will examine how China 
has impacted Australia’s security relations with the United States. 
1. Liberal Theory: Economic Interdependence 
Liberal scholars say the EI theory applies effectively to the Asia-Pacific, and 
explains why there has not been a major militarized conflict in the region since the end of 
the Cold-War. Bruce Russett, in “Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations,” explains how economic interdependence, along with 
democracy and international organizations, contributes to peace between states.4 There is 
a general agreement among scholars working in this paradigm that China will be more 
likely to establish harmonious relations with neighboring powers in order to maintain its 
economic growth, trade, access to resources, and external and internal stability.5 
Other scholarly works support the applicability of EI but with caveats. Goldsmith 
in “A Liberal Peace in Asia,” says that EI is important in reducing conflict in Asia, but “the 
strong intra-Asian effect of trade interdependence does not translate into a robust pacific 
effect between Asian states and those outside the region.”6 China’s rise may have increased 
competition between different regional orders in East Asia, but these orders can coexist.7  
Tonnesson argues that conflict can be mitigated between a rising China and the United 
States, if both sides are able to deter each other with conventional and nuclear forces, and 
avoid actions that reduce economic interdependence.8 Additionally, third party countries, 
 
4 Bruce M. Russett, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International 
Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001), 125. 
5 David Pak Yue Leon, “Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Situating China’s 
Economic and Military Rise,” Asian Politics & Policy 9, no. 1 (2017): 9–30, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12300; Erich Weede, “The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: 
Establishing Global Harmony by Economic Interdependence,” International Interactions 36, no. 2 (May 
24, 2010): 206–13, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050621003785181. 
6 Benjamin E. Goldsmith, “A Liberal Peace in Asia?,” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 1 (2007): 5, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307072427. 
7 Kai He, “Contested Regional Orders and Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific,” International 
Politics 52, no. 2 (February 2015): 208–22, https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2014.46. 
8 Stein Tønnesson, “Deterrence, Interdependence and Sino–US Peace,” International Area Studies 
Review 18, no. 3 (September 1, 2015): 297–311, https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865915596660. 
6 
such as Japan, will be important in securing this peace as long as they remain under the 
U.S. nuclear umbrella, and tightly integrated into both the American and Chinese 
economies. As nuclear deterrence may reduce the likelihood of major war between powers, 
state competition is more likely to play out in the economic sphere. Finally, Copeland 
suggests that EI can both reduce the risk of war for states in the best of circumstances but 
lead them to conflict if they are cut off from critical resources/commerce.9 Thus, EI is often 
thought to have broadly positive implications for relationships between countries, but there 
is another side to EI. When EI involves statecraft and coercion, it may lead to more 
conflictual relationships 
2. Economic Statecraft and Coercion 
Norris defines economic statecraft as “state manipulation of international economic 
activities for strategic purposes.”10 Economic coercion is a subset of economic statecraft. 
Drezner in 1999, defined economic coercion as “the threat or act by a nation-state or 
coalition of nation-states, called the sender, to disrupt economic exchange with another 
nation state, called the target, unless the targeted country acquiesces to an articulated 
political demand.”11 Hanson provides a broader definition for coercion as “non-militarized 
coercion” or “the use of threats of negative actions to force the target state to change 
behavior.”12 
When China applies economic coercive tactics, its political demands may not be 
very articulated or clear. Also, China is more inclined to coerce using informal methods 
versus more formal methods. Formal methods, for example, would be the United States 
announcing sanctions against a regime. According to Schrader, 
Unlike sanctions levied by the United States and other democracies, 
Chinese coercive economic actions are not confined by a transparent legal 
regime and are not typically acknowledged by the Chinese government. 
 
9 Dale C. Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War (Princeton University Press, 2014), 7. 
10 William J. Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and State 
Control (Ithaca, New York; Cornell University Press, 2016), 3. 
11 Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2. 
12 Hanson, Currey, and Beattie, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Coercive Diplomacy,” 4. 
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Both characteristics increase ambiguity about the means and ends of 
sanctions.13 
There is an agreement among experts that specific economic coercive tactics 
against another state’s commercial actors include popular boycotts, tourism restrictions, 
trade restrictions, restrictions on official travel, and enhanced restrictions or regulations.14 
The state applies economic coercion to pressure the targeted state’s commercial actors who 
then pressure their own government to comply with the applying state’s demands or 
interests. The more economic power a state has the more leverage it can apply against less 
economically powerful states and entities.  
States’ use of economic statecraft and coercion to pursue strategic goals have been 
going on for hundreds of years. After looking through global historical cases going back 
from 1790, Copeland found that high EI can help foster peace by giving states more tools 
to respond to the negative actions conducted by another state. Thus, having the option to 
use economic coercion can actually reduce the necessity or attractiveness of having to 
pursue more physically coercive actions such as use of force which can lead to further 
security misunderstandings and escalation. States that are dependent on trade and 
investment but still deliberately impose economic sanctions signal that they are “willing to 
suffer high costs to achieve their objectives. This should eliminate any underestimations of 
their resolve.”15  
There is an agreement among experts that a state’s use of economic coercion can 
be effective in helping it achieve strategic goals if it is conducted under certain conditions. 
In 1985, Baldwin argued that academic literature largely neglected the study and potential 
of economic statecraft, and proposed the need for more data collection and analysis in order 
to better understand it and prepare against it. Drezner built on this need and in his research 
found that economic coercion would be more effective if certain conditions were met with 
 
13 Matt Schrader, “A Framework for Understanding Chinese Political Interference in Democratic 
Countries,” Alliance for Securing Democracy, April 2020, 5. 
14 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1985), 42; 
Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 2; Hanson, Currey, and Beattie, “The Chinese Communist Party’s 
Coercive Diplomacy”; Harrell, Rosenberg, and Sarvalle, “China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures.” 
15 Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War, 21. 
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the sender’s signaling and with the target’s domestic politics. The sender’s sanctions would 
be more effective if it shows willingness to bear pain from enacting those sanctions, if 
military forces are threatened or used, and if the sender can gain international 
cooperation.16 For the target’s domestic conditions, the target regime must be domestically 
unstable and the sanctions must hurt the elites as much as the general population. 
Norris concluded that in order for economic statecraft to be effective, state control 
and unity in the sender country is essential.17 Economic coercion, particularly those that 
utilize informal methods, require close cooperation between state actors and commercial 
actors. State actors need to be unified themselves and have adequate influence and leverage 
over commercial actors in order to impact commercial relations with another state’s 
commercial actors. Finally, Copeland argues that EI can help foster peace but if future trade 
expectations look poor and threatens a state’s access to markets or critical resources, then 
actual physical conflict becomes increasingly likely.  
3.  Chinese Economic Statecraft and Coercion  
China is known to use its economic power against other countries to pursue its 
strategic goals. Various scholars describe Chinese economic statecraft, its variations and 
limitations, and how China uses it to signal other states to not engage in misbehavior.18 
China has varying levels of control over its commercial actors due to the existence of state-
owned companies and CCP influence over the success of Chinese companies. These 
varying levels of control gives the United States some targeting avenues for leverage over 
China with the objective of mitigating conflict.19 
 
16 Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 14. 
17 Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and State Control, 223. 
18 Evan A. Feigenbaum, “Is Coercion the New Normal in China’s Economic Statecraft?,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, July 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/07/25/is-coercion-
new-normal-in-china-s-economic-statecraft-pub-72632; Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft Commercial 
Actors, Grand Strategy, and State Control; James Reilly, “China’s Unilateral Sanctions,” The Washington 
Quarterly 35, no. 4 (October 2012): 121–33, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.726428; Schrader, “A 
Framework for Understanding Chinese Political Interference in Democratic Countries.” 
19 Richard Nephew, “China and Economic Sanctions: Where Does Washington Have Leverage?,” 
Brookings (blog), September 30, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/research/china-and-economic-sanctions-
where-does-washington-have-leverage/. 
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Feigenbaum categorized five types of economic leverage China employs to 
influence the targeted state’s behavior: passive, active, exclusionary, coercive and latent.20 
Exclusionary is when the state grants or denies the targeted state access to its own market. 
This form of economic statecraft allows the state to pursue more informal channels and 
methods against the targeted state. State actions and intentions are more overt and official 
when applying formal tactics such as economic sanctions against the targeted entity. China 
is well suited to using exclusionary leverage due to its large economy and market. It also 
has influence over both state-owned enterprises and private companies. Chinese companies 
have to comply with Chinese state narratives and guidance in order to operate effectively 
within the country. This option provides the Chinese state more plausible deniability and 
can precede more distinct coercive action.  
Many examples of this are visible.21 China employs a multitude of economic 
statecraft tactics. First, it imposed import and export restrictions designed to pressure the 
target country’s economy. For example, China restricted exports of rare earth metals to 
Japan over territorial disputes, import restrictions on Norwegian seafood after the Nobel 
Peace Prize being awarded to a Chinese dissident, and import restrictions on Filipino fruits 
during a maritime confrontation. Second, China urged popular boycotts to convince 
governments to act in line with Chinese demands. For example, again during territorial 
disputes with Japan, Chinese authorities encouraged boycotts of Japanese goods. Third, 
restrictions on tourism is a common Chinese economic coercive tactic. This was seen 
during confrontations with Japan, Philippines, and Taiwan. Fourth, China exerts pressure 
on corporate executives by threatening their business operations in China if they do not fall 
in line with CCP interests. For example, in Taiwan after the election of the Democratic 
Progressive Party candidate Tsai Ing-Wen, China pressured corporate executives to 
reaffirm the One China policy and deter calls for Taiwanese independence. Further analysis 
 
20 Feigenbaum, “Is Coercion the New Normal in China’s Economic Statecraft?” 
21 In order to provide further understanding about Chinese capabilities and intentions, this paragraph 
will heavily draw on Harrell’s “China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures,” and Hanson’s “The Chinese 
Communist Party’s Coercive Diplomacy,” to go through other recent cases of Chinese economic coercion 
outside of Australia and ROK (Japan, Norway, Philippines, Taiwan, Mongolia). Hanson, Currey, and 
Beattie, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Coercive Diplomacy”; Harrell, Rosenberg, and Sarvalle, 
“China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures.” 
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of these cases will be conducted in Chapter II of the research and the broad studies on the 
large and growing universe of cases of Chinese coercion are discussed in the following 
section on research methodology. 
4. Sino-ROK Relations 
Chinese economic power has had an impact on ROK and its security relations with 
the United States. Kim in “South Korea’s Strategy toward a Rising China, Security 
Dynamics in East Asia, and International Relations Theory,” describes how ROK’s 
strategy and behavior towards China has been affected by the factors of EI, the U.S.-
centered hub and spoke alliance model, North Korea, ROK’s domestic leadership changes, 
and perception of threat in the region.22 Various scholars explain how ROK is deeply 
economically integrated with China–giving China more tools to influence the state.23 
Additionally, improving relations between ROK and China may complicate future ROK 
security relations with the United States. Further discussion about these components is in 
Chapter III.  
5.  Sino-Australia Relations 
Finally, Chinese economic power has had an impact on Australia and its security 
relations with the United States. Australia-focused scholars argue that economics has 
played a significant role in increasingly forcing Australia into pursuing a “bifurcated 
foreign policy” with the U.S. and China.24 One focusing on economic development while 
 
22 M.-h. Kim, “South Koreas Strategy toward a Rising China, Security Dynamics in East Asia, and 
International Relations Theory,” Asian Survey 56, no. 4 (August 1, 2016): 707–30, 
https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2016.56.4.707. 
23 Hugh White, The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power (Oxford: University Press, 2013); 
Ron Huisken, “CSCAP Regional Security Outlook” (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, 
2019), http://www.cscap.org/uploads/cscap%202020%20v3.pdf; Schrader, “A Framework for 
Understanding Chinese Political Interference in Democratic Countries.” 
24 Nicholas Thomas, “The Economics of Power Transitions: Australia between China and the United 
States,” Journal of Contemporary China 24, no. 95 (September 3, 2015): 846–64, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1013376; J. D. Kenneth Boutin, “Beyond Interdependence: 
Economic Security and Sino-American-Australian Trilateralism,” International Journal 70, no. 3 (2015): 
372–390, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702015586187; J. Reilly, “Counting On China? Australia’s Strategic 
Response to Economic Interdependence,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 5, no. 4 (December 
1, 2012): 369–94, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pos016. 
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the other focusing on security needs. Prominent Australian scholar and former defense 
minister Hugh White argues that the best way forward for everyone would be for the U.S. 
to share power with China in Asia.25 The alternative is too risky, and Australia should 
strive for more independent military capability. Australia has growing fears about China’s 
power and U.S. credibility for defense.26 Searight and Schrader report on Chinese political 
and economic influence into Australian affairs, Australia’s response, and subsequent 
Chinese responses. Further discussion about these components is in Chapter IV. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis primarily conducts comparative case studies of ROK and Australia and 
their relations to China (primarily economic) and the United States (primarily security). 
Descriptive country case studies examine how Chinese economic interactions have 
impacted ROK’s and Australia’s political and security policies, particularly those 
connected to U.S. security objectives. For ROK, I examine the THAAD case focusing on 
China’s use of economic statecraft and whether it caused ROK to diverge from U.S. 
security efforts against DPRK, military exercises, Trilateral Alliance, and China. For 
Australia, I examine how Chinese economic statecraft impacted Australia’s participation 
in U.S. security efforts in regard to Taiwan, SCS, foreign interference, and the Huawei 5G 
ban. Each of these cases present a scenario where the targeted country pursued an action 
that immediately displeased China. China decided to respond with targeted economic 
measures to display its disapproval and to influence the country’s future course of action. 
There is confidence in having sufficient data for the thesis research as the cases were 
extracted from the hundreds of cases recorded in the larger studies (ASPI, CNAS, Zhang). 
The cases were deemed as the most important examples for the thesis study due to their 
applicability of how China’s use of economic coercion against U.S. allies may impact U.S. 
security relations. The thesis evaluated the possibility of doing a case-study on Japan as it 
is also a U.S. ally and a democracy with a developed economy. However, Japan was 
excluded from an in-depth case study for several reasons. First, the most recent cases of 
 
25 White, The China Choice. 
26 Huisken, “CSCAP Regional Security Outlook.” 
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Chinese economic coercion being conducted against Australia and ROK, so there is more 
value to understand the most recent Chinese practices. Second, Japan is likely to be more 
able and willing to balance against China while Australia and ROK are more on the fence 
about either challenging or accommodating China. Thus, we learn more about Chinese 
capabilities in these “easier” cases for coercion, which is important since Chinese 
capabilities are likely to continue to rise. 
For each case study, I investigate the targeted country’s interests, identify Chinese 
interests, how China applied economic coercion, impacts on the targeted country’s 
policymaking, and any effect on its alliance with the United States. The main objective is 
to identify if China was successful in changing or weakening Australia’s and ROK’s 
security alignment with the United States. Why or why not? Was Chinese economic 
statecraft the primary factor or could there have been other factors driving those countries’ 
strategic decision-making processes? An additional objective is to identify similarities and 
differences between China’s approach to each country and how those countries were able 
to respond to China. Lastly, toward the end of each case chapter there will be a 
consideration of future scenarios and cases where China may potentially use economic 
coercion to impact each country’s security relations with the United States.  
The research incorporates both quantitative and qualitative data. Each case chapter 
starts off with an analysis of economic trends and data between China and the countries. 
Identifying and explaining economic factors is critical to understanding state intentions, 
interests and leverage towards one another. The quantitative evidence includes measuring 
the state actors’ level of bilateral trade and reliance on strategic exports and resources over 
a period of 20 years (2000–2020). The World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution 
(WITS) database is primarily used to measure economic data (total bilateral trade, share of 
country’s trade) while other scholarly sources are used to reference other economic activity 
(ex. foreign direct investment, tourism, foreign student revenue) and identify important 
resources (ex. energy).  
In order to comprehensively collect data on all known accounts of Chinese 
economic coercion, three sources were primarily examined and used for aggregating cases 
the study. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has a comprehensive report 
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examining 152 cases of Chinese economic coercion across 27 countries.27 the Center for 
New American Security (CNAS) developed a similar study looking at 9 country cases since 
2010.28 Lastly, Ketian Zhang’s article “Cautious Bully: Reputation Resolve, and Beijing’s 
Use of Coercion in the South China Sea.”29 Academia and policy researchers have 
investigated, documented and largely concluded them to be evidence of Chinese economic 
coercive tactics. Together, these reports provide a fairly comprehensive description of the 
universe of cases of China’s use of economic coercion in at least the past 10 years. Each of 
these sources is discussed in turn. 
ASPI is an independent think-tank that provides the Australian government 
information on a range of issues. Their Chinese coercion report used both English and 
Chinese open-source information (news articles, academic research, business activities, 
social media posts, official government documents and statements, etc.) to create a 
database that was also peer reviewed by dozens of experts in different countries.30 It 
focuses on acts of coercion with a clear link to state disputes and excludes cases where 
“measures were considered a normal or proportionate diplomatic response to state conduct” 
such as the US-China trade war.31 The thesis heavily draws on ASPI’s methodology 
towards examining cases of Chinese coercion and its collection of quantitative and 
qualitative evidence. The ASPI report found that the most common coercive method used 
by China were state-issued threats, trade restrictions and tourism restrictions.32 
Additionally, Australia had the highest number of recorded cases of being subjected to 
Chinese coercion. 
 
27 Hanson, Currey, and Beattie, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Coercive Diplomacy.” 
28 Harrell, Rosenberg, and Sarvalle, “China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures.” 
29 Hanson, Currey, and Beattie, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Coercive Diplomacy”; Harrell, 
Rosenberg, and Sarvalle, “China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures”; Ketian Zhang, “Cautious Bully: 
Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing’s Use of Coercion in the South China Sea,” International Security 44, no. 
1 (August 5, 2019): 117–59. 
30 Hanson, Currey, and Beattie, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Coercive Diplomacy,” 6. 
31 Hanson, Currey, and Beattie, 7. 
32 Hanson, Currey, and Beattie, 11. 
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CNAS is a think tank that provides information about national security issues to the 
United States government. Similar to ASPI, CNAS draws on both English and Chinese 
open source information but focuses in-depth on nine country cases of Chinese economic 
coercion. The report was published in 2018 which predates significant documented 
analysis of a number of recent Chinese economic coercion cases against Australia. The 
report found that over time, China’s coercive tactics are adapting and more sophisticated 
as they have become more precise in targeting, and are combined with other tools of 
statecraft including economic incentives and diplomatic engagement. The thesis also draws 
on the report’s data primarily for ROK and five other country cases (Japan, Taiwan, 
Philippines, Norway, Mongolia).  
Lastly, Ketian Zhang is a renown international relations and comparative politics 
scholar that researches in multiple fields including coercion, economic statecraft and 
maritime disputes. Her article focuses on China’s use of coercion during South China Sea 
(SCS) disputes going back to 1990. She argues that China is likely to use coercion in SCS 
disputes when 
the need to establish a reputation for resolve exceeds economic cost, China 
uses coercion. When the likelihood of a geopolitical backlash is high, it 
prefers to use nonmilitarized coercion. China believes that having 
capabilities but not demonstrating the willingness to use them may lead to 
deterrence failure. In a sense, China uses coercion for purposes of 
deterrence, blurring the line between the two.33 
The thesis references her data and analysis of the 2012 China-Philippines Scarborough 
Shoal Incident but draws more on her conceptual analysis of China’s decision-making 
calculus when it comes to using coercion. These three sources were primarily used to gather 
sufficient data on all known accounts of Chinese economic coercion in the past 10 years. 
They also provided conceptual analysis and methodology that heavily influenced this thesis 
research’s analysis. 
Chapter II starts out with a survey and a short history of recent Chinese economic 
coercion and how it was applied to other countries such as Japan, Norway, Philippines, 
 
33 Zhang, “Cautious Bully,” 157. 
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Taiwan and Mongolia. The purpose is to provide additional insight about Chinese 
economic coercion and possibly reinforce any themes or identify consistent tactics. 
Chapters III and IV are the country case studies of ROK and Australia. The 20-year 
research period was selected since prior to that period, China’s status as a great power 
vying for regional leadership was not yet established. The thesis references 20-years of 
detailed bilateral relations records to determine what were instances of Chinese economic 
coercion against ROK and Australia. 
E. MAIN FINDINGS 
The thesis research has five main findings that present mixed results regarding 
China’s use of economic coercion to impact ROK’s and Australia’s security relations with 
the United States. First, Chinese economic coercive tactics has grown more active and 
sophisticated overtime and Beijing has become more inclined to use them. Second, while 
some short-term economic pain is experienced by the target country, generally overall 
long-term economic relations between the countries continued to prosper. Third, China’s 
use of economic coercive tactics has been partially effective but has not create concrete 
and clear changes to ROK’s and Australia’s security relations with the United States. 
Fourth, China’s economic coercion against the targeted countries seemed more effective if 
it aligned with the targeted countries’ security interests. Finally, results suggest that China’ 
use of economic coercion can be more harmful against its own regional interests in the long 
run. These findings will be expanded further throughout the research and in the conclusion.  
16 
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II. SURVEY OF CHINESE ECONOMIC COERCION, 2010–2020 
A. INTRODUCTION 
China has reemerged as a major power with massive economic power and 
influence. For the past 10 years, China has increasingly applied this economic power to 
respond to what it perceives as bad behavior from other states. Going forward especially 
in an era of great power competition, China will very likely continue to use its significant 
economic weight and capabilities as part of its statecraft toolbox to influence other states. 
In order to provide further understanding about Chinese capabilities and intentions, this 
chapter will go over key cases of Chinese economic coercion in the past 10 years. It will 
look at China’s actions against: Japan over territorial disputes with the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands, Norway for awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident, Scarborough 
Shoal dispute with the Philippines, Mongolia for allowing a visit from the Dalai Lama, and 
Taiwan’s election of Tsai Ing-Wen. As briefly discussed in Chapter I, these cases were 
selected for study out of hundreds of other potential cases due to the nature of Chinese 
economic coercion being used as a response to another government’s action which China 
perceived as a threat to its core interests. As China’s economic power grows, its use of 
economic coercive measures has become more sophisticated and frequented as it looks to 
influence state behavior. It has shown that it is willing to use economic coercion for a range 
of issues including territorial disputes, human rights, and security interests.  
B. JAPAN 
China applied exclusionary and coercive economic tactics against Japan during 
territorial disputes in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In September 2010, a Chinese fishing 
boat and a Japanese coast guard patrol boat crashed together near the island chain. The 
Japanese patrol then detained the Chinese captain. China was accused of responding to the 
incident by restricting exports of rare-earth metals to Japan. Rare-earth metals are critical 
to the Japanese technology sector and China is responsible for about 93% of the world’s 
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mining of it.34 Though the Chinese government before the incident had already talked about 
enacting quotas on exporting the metals, the timing of enacting the restrictions right after 
the incident was assessed by the Japanese government as politically motivated.35 The 
disputed islands flared up again in 2012 when the Japanese government bought some of 
the islands from a private owner. Through state-controlled media, China responded 
encouraging boycotts of Japanese goods and companies including major names like Honda, 
Canon, Panasonic and Uniqlo.36 There was vandalism and damage to Japanese businesses 
in China caused by Chinese protestors. China also warned its citizens of travelling to Japan 
causing a reported a 40% drop in Chinese tourism according to the Japanese National 
Tourism Organization. 37 
China’s actions against Japan during the island disputes displayed two things: one, 
China was able to adapt its methods over time and two, Japan was able to respond and 
somewhat mitigate Chinese economic pressure. Restricting exports of rare-earth metals 
was seen by many countries to be a red flag of the threat of Chinese economic power. Japan 
collaborated with the United States and the European Union to bring a case against China 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and later won in 2014.38 In 2012, China decided 
to pursue less risky and significant retaliation by encouraging popular boycotts and 
restricting tourism to Japan. These Chinese actions did cause Japan to begin seeking to 
diversify some of its supply chains away from the Chinese market.  
C. NORWAY 
In 2010, China began applying exclusionary and coercive economic tactics against 
Norway in response to the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to the Chinese dissident Liu 
Xiaobo. Despite Norway pleading to China that the Nobel Committee is independent of 
the Norwegian Government, China responded to the award decision with an array of 
 
34 Hanson, Currey, and Beattie, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Coercive Diplomacy,” 37. 
35 Harrell, Rosenberg, and Sarvalle, “China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures,” 9. 
36 Hanson, Currey, and Beattie, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Coercive Diplomacy,” 36. 
37 Hanson, Currey, and Beattie, 37. 
38 Harrell, Rosenberg, and Sarvalle, “China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures,” 9. 
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actions. The Chinese government first issued a statement by saying the award decision was 
a “grave mistake that would have damaging consequences for Sino-Norwegian 
relations.”39 Bilateral free trade discussions between the two countries were cancelled and 
would not resume until 7 years later after Norway apologized and reconfirmed the One-
China policy.40 China restricted Norwegian salmon exports by “applying more stringent 
inspection methods and changing customs practices” causing a 61.8% drop in sales of 
salmon in China.41 In 2012, China excluded Norwegians from visa-free transits which was 
granted to other European countries.42 
The Nobel Peace Prize incident revealed two more things about Chinese economic 
coercive tactics: one, China is willing to punish a government for the actions of an 
independent entity operating within its borders, and two, Chinese coercion became more 
complex. The Norwegian government tried to tell China that the Nobel Committee was not 
under its control but it did not stop Chinese retaliatory actions. China may not only look to 
punish private organizations for government actions but may also punish the government 
for private actions. Next, in this case China applied an array of economic and diplomatic 
issues. It used state threats along with threatening trade negotiations, tourism and exports. 
Finally, as we see in many other cases, the target (in this case Norway) was able to adapt 
and partially mitigate Chinese trade restrictions by looking to diversify its salmon exports 
elsewhere.43 
D. PHILIPPINES 
China applied military and exclusionary economic tactics against the Philippines in 
response to territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS). In 2012, Chinese and Filipino 
boats faced off in a disputed part of the SCS known as Scarborough Shoal. Militarily, 
originally between Chinese fishing boats and a Filipino Navy flagship, the Philippines 
 
39 Hanson, Currey, and Beattie, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Coercive Diplomacy,” 18. 
40 Hanson, Currey, and Beattie, 18. 
41 Hanson, Currey, and Beattie, 39. 
42 Hanson, Currey, and Beattie, 18. 
43 Hanson, Currey, and Beattie, 39. 
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withdrew the flagship to deescalate tensions while China escalated the conflict by 
deploying two maritime surveillance ships and their most advanced and largest patrol 
vessel.44 Economically, China instituted trade restrictions by restricting imports of Filipino 
bananas citing infestations of insects.45 It also issued a travel warning for its citizens 
regarding travel to the Philippines citing extensive threats of violence. Chinese tourism to 
the Philippines fell from 18,479 in August 2012 to 7,000 in September 2012.46 
Chinese economic coercion against the Philippines during the Scarborough Shoal 
Incident revealed two more things: one, China’s willingness to incorporate gray-zone 
military tactics, and two, economic coercion can be used for deterrence purposes against 
other observing countries. China again displayed an array of tactics ranging from military, 
diplomatic to economic in order to achieve its strategic objectives. At the time, China was 
also having disputes with other SCS neighboring countries and its approach the Philippines 
would seemingly have a larger impact in affecting the region. Ketian Zhang stated that 
China uses coercion for the purposes of deterrence and establishing a reputation for 
resolve.47 As with other countries, the Philippines was able to deescalate tensions with 
China when in 2016, Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte shifted his policy to be more 
approaching to China by entering high level talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, 
playing into Beijing’s narrative about China’s constructive role in the region and America’s 
disruptive role, and accepting new economic deals. According to Hanson, since then there 
has been no further recorded cases of Chinese economic and diplomatic coercion against 
the Philippines.48 
 
44 Renato Cruz De Castro, “Facing Up to China’s Realpolitik Approach in the South China Sea 
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46 Hanson, Currey, and Beattie, 40. 
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E. TAIWAN 
China applied exclusionary economic tactics against Taiwan in attempt to dissuade 
Taiwanese voters from supporting pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
candidate Tsai Ing-Wen. China considers Taiwan a runaway province and has been 
applying influence and economic coercive tactics against it for decades in order to keep it 
from pursuing formal independence. Leading up to the 2016 elections, there were reports 
of China influencing candidates, restricting tourism, and leaning on certain Taiwanese 
businesses to pressure DDP candidate Tsai Ing-Wen.49 Leading up to the 2016 election and 
after when President Tsai was elected, China cut tourism to the island. Chinese tourists 
account for about a quarter of Taiwan’s overseas visitors and in 2017, an estimated 22% of 
fewer Chinese tourists travelled to Taiwan than the year prior.50 This occurred again in 
2019 leading up to the 2020 election where Taiwan saw 57% fewer tourism from China 
than the year prior.51 
Chinese economic coercion against Taiwan reveals one more important thing–it 
can backfire. Despite Chinese pressure in both elections, Tsai Ing-Wen was victorious and 
rode on a platform of anti-mainland sentiment. More and more people in Taiwan are 
associating themselves with Taiwanese identity which is a major concern for the CCP who 
sees reuniting both territories as a core interest. Taiwan was able to partially mitigate 
tourism restrictions from China by engaging in a campaign to attract visitors from other 
countries such as those in Southeast Asia.52 
F. MONGOLIA 
China applied exclusionary and coercive economic tactics against Mongolia in 
response to the Dalai Lama’s visit in 2016. China considers the Dalai Lama a dangerous 
separatist and was outraged that Mongolia allowed him to attend and speak at public events 
in the country. 84% of Mongolia’s exports goes to China making it the most China-
 
49 Harrell, Rosenberg, and Sarvalle, “China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures.” 
50 Harrell, Rosenberg, and Sarvalle, 6. 
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dependent country in the world.53 As a response to the visit, China suspended bilateral talks 
over billions of dollars of infrastructure investments, and imposed additional fees on 
borders transits and mining commodities.54 At the time, Mongolia was already facing a 
worsening economic situation and struggled to handle additional Chinese pressure. After 
standing up to China in the past and initially during this incident, Mongolian leaders 
relented by issuing a formal public apology and emphasizing that they would no longer 
host the Dalai Lama.55 
Chinese actions against Mongolia revealed two things about the effectiveness of its 
use of economic coercion. First, Chinese economic coercion seemed to have more leverage 
over the target country’s decision-making when it coincided with other factors challenging 
the target country. Mongolia was already facing an economic crisis and Chinese economic 
pressure seemed to have magnified the pain. This may be truer especially with the 
geographic position of Mongolia being landlocked and sharing a border with China. 
Second, despite Mongolia relenting to Chinese pressure, long term results of Chinese 
economic coercion are unclear. In 2017, the subsequent Mongolian president “expressed 
interest in reasserting Mongolian independence to invite the Dalai Lama.”56 This pattern 
of the target country resisting Chinese demands will be seen again in the case studies of 
ROK and Australia. 
G. CONCLUSION 
China’s growing economic power has allowed it to utilize economic coercive 
measures to influence the behavior of other states. These economic coercive measures have 
become increasingly used and sophisticated as they are integrated with other forms of 
statecraft to pursue Chinese strategic interests. The actions are measured and precise 
allowing the target country to recover economic and diplomatic relations with China if they 
cooperate. China has shown that it will use an array of measures to defend its territorial 
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sovereignty in the cases of Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan. It will pressure 
governments, such as Norway and Mongolia, from hosting or abetting human rights 
accusations against it. However, Chinese economic coercive actions have achieved mixed 
results. As we have seen from these cases, every country was able to adapt to and partially 
mitigate Chinese measures by diversifying their supply chains and markets. While many 
of these countries have either issued apologies or entered some kind of talks with China, 
there seems to have been no concrete long-term changes to the status quo. China should be 
concerned about continuing to apply economic measures as public opinion in many of these 
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III. SOUTH KOREA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Republic of Korea (ROK) is a longstanding treaty ally of the United States, but 
a rising China will progressively challenge the alliance’s unity. Chung categorizes ROK as 
an active hedger (a state more proactive and savvier in hedging) as it looks to balance both 
economic interests with China and security relations with the United States.58 The 
Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains ROK’s top national security priority. This 
security challenge requires ROK to engage both China and the United States, with ROK 
perceiving China as having more options and influence over DPRK behavior.59 Similar to 
the China-Australia relationship, China and ROK have had increasing economic 
interdependence (EI) over the past 20 years and ROK sees its economic future dependent 
on having good relations with China. EI has increased prosperity for both countries but has 
also given China more economic tools for leverage. How has China’s use of economic 
coercion impacted ROK’s security relations with the United States?  
This chapter focuses on Sino-ROK relations by analyzing the Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) crisis. After examining 20 years’ worth of records 
detailing bilateral relations, this crisis stands out as the only time where China clearly 
utilized economic statecraft to impact ROK behavior and achieve its strategic objectives.60 
Prior to the THAAD crisis, China was likely more hesitant to utilize economic statecraft 
due to the lack of options it had with a growing economy and a desire to improve relations 
with a neighbor and economic power like ROK. The U.S.-ROK deployment of the THAAD 
was a clear and prominent case of Chinese economic coercion effectively influencing ROK 
security affairs and thus disrupting cohesion in the U.S.-ROK alliance.  
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B. ECONOMIC TRENDS AND DATA 
Trade between ROK and China has consistently increased between 2000–2018 and 
ROK sees its economic future dependent on having good relations with China. In 2000, 
Chinese trade made up about $12.8B or 8% of all ROK imports, and made up $18.5B or 
10.7% of all ROK exports.61  By 2018, these numbers had significantly jumped up as 
Chinese trade made up $106.5B or 20% of all ROK imports, and $162B or 26.8% of all 
ROK exports.62 China became both ROK’s largest export market and source of imports. 
On the other hand, ROK is also an important trading partner for China. In 2000, ROK trade 
made up about $23B or 10.7% of all Chinese imports, and made up $11.3B or 4.5% of all 
Chinese exports.63 By 2018, trade proportionally stayed relatively stable but the value 
significantly increased as ROK trade made up $205B or 10.3% of all Chinese imports, and 
$109B or 4.4% of all Chinese exports.64 ROK is China’s fourth-largest export market and 
its largest sources of imports (slightly larger than Japan).  
While there has been significant increasing EI between both countries, it is also 
increasingly uneven. In 2014, ROK and China negotiated a free trade agreement (FTA), 
and in 2015 ROK joined the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
becoming its fifth-largest shareholder, and contributed hundreds of millions of dollars.65 
China played a huge role in helping ROK recover from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
and has been a major source of ROK’s trade surplus.66 In 2018, there was about $6.3B 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flow from China to ROK, while about $750 million FDI 
flow from ROK to China.67 China accounts for ROK’s largest foreign student body in 
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universities and schools, and hundreds of thousands of Chinese tourists visit ROK each 
month, making up about half of ROK’s total tourist visits.68 ROK semiconductors made 
up about 27% of all its exports to China in 2018.69 China currently does not have a strong 
indigenous chip-making industry and relies on countries such as ROK to provide chips to 
feed its technology boom. Also, ROK FDI into Chinese chip-making has continued to 
dramatically increase over recent years.70 Chinese tourism and investment altogether 
makes up about 11% of ROK GDP.71 Overall, of the two countries, ROK is significantly 
more economically dependent on China. Kim observed that ROK’s dependency ratio 
significantly rose from 2.8% in 1990 to 21% in 2010, while China’s dependency ratio 
stayed relatively stable.72 This both makes ROK significantly more vulnerable to pressure 
from China while giving China more economic options to leverage against ROK.  
Tensions come into play between China and ROK when ROK acts in line with its 
long-standing security partner, the United States. According to Kim, Seoul will likely 
continue a “hedging strategy with China in the future due to growing economic dependence 
and an intensifying Sino-US strategic competition.”73 Moreover, EI is expected to make 
ROK less likely to balance against China, and more likely to engage it. The U.S. 
deployment of the THAAD system in ROK tested relations between ROK and China.  
C. THAAD CASE STUDY 
In July 2016, ROK and the United States announced the deployment of the 
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea in order to address 
threats from DPRK. This sparked an immediate negative reaction from Beijing where it 
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saw the deployment as a threat to China’s strategic interests. The THAAD crises presents 
a case where Chinese economic coercion had an impact on U.S.-ROK security relations. 
U.S.-ROK security relations will likely be further challenged going forward with growing 
Chinese power and Sino-ROK economic interdependence.  
1. Identifying ROK Interests 
It is also important to note that ROK’s security relations are not exclusive to the 
United States, nor are its economic relations exclusive to China. ROK’s economic miracle 
in the 1970s and 1980s occurred in the context of a stable and secured environment 
supported by the United States. Also, Kim stated how, under the hub and spokes system in 
which bilateral alliances and relationships puts the United States at the center of a network 
of Asian security relations, U.S. security commitments have allowed ROK to directly 
engage and deepen economic ties with China.74 ROK is also well aware of the potential 
threat China presents with its size, proximity, economic and military power and long 
history of having ROK as a tributary state under imperial Chinese influence.75 ROK is able 
to effectively hedge China for economic benefits and opportunities because of the presence 
of the United States and its capabilities. At the same time, ROK perceives China as having 
more options than the United States in influencing DPRK behavior because of the 
economic and diplomatic pressure China can apply.76 ROK’s position can therefore be 
described as one in which it would prefer not to disrupt good relations with either side in 
order to avoid negatively impacting its economy and security environment. However, a 
growing Sino-U.S. competition and strategic rivalry will increasingly pressure it do so.  
The purpose of the THAAD was to defend the ROK people and alliance forces from 
DPRK nuclear and ballistic missile threats. Since the Korean War in 1950, the threat of 
DPRK invasion and regional instability have kept U.S. forces in the Korean Peninsula. 
U.S. security guarantees have helped mitigate the threat DPRK presents to ROK and Japan. 
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The ROK and U.S. have been contemplating deploying the THAAD for years. A DPRK 
nuclear test in 2016 finally led to the United States and ROK announcing the THAAD 
deployment in the Korean Peninsula. The THAAD crisis is a part of a growing larger 
dilemma ROK faces—its ability to balance its desires of maintaining security relations with 
the United States while maintaining and growing economic ties with China.  
2. Identifying China’s Interests 
In order to promote its own development, economic objectives have been an 
important and consistent reason for China’s engagement with ROK. Chinese leaders and 
scholars have cited that China’s primary goals include developing through peaceful means, 
having harmonious engagement with other countries, and promoting globalization and free 
trade.77 As China has grown stronger economically and militarily, it has also become more 
assertive in its foreign affairs and policy. While China prefers to pursue its interests without 
harming relations or trade, the THAAD crisis is an example where China did disrupt 
economic relations with an important partner in order to pursue what it perceives as a 
greater strategic objective.  
China is against the THAAD deployment primarily due to the potential regional 
instability that would stem from the strategic military advantage it provides to the United 
States. In 2012, Luo Zhaohui, the Director-General of the Department of Asian Affairs 
within China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that “Building a missile defense system 
in the Asia-Pacific region will have negative effects on global and regional strategic 
stability, and go against the security needs of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region.”78 
China believed that the THAAD radar range fell well into its territory and would provide 
a strategic advantage to the United States by providing a greater ability to detect and track 
China’s missiles. Furthermore, Talmadge states that new missile defenses would provide 
the United States a “damage limitation capability that might tempt the United States to 
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launch a nuclear first strike against China.”79 In short, China fears the current regional 
strategic balance falling further in favor of the United States and thus threatening China’s 
national security.  
China seeks to deter regional countries from deploying missile defenses in concert 
with the United States. Luo warned other countries in the region “to act prudently in 
cooperating with the U.S. on missile defense, and not develop or deploy missile defense 
systems that exceed the needs of its development.”80 In ROK, the Chinese Ambassador 
stated that ties “could be destroyed in an instant” and “could take a long time to recover” 
if ROK went forward with the deployment.”81 As ROK did go forward with the THAAD 
deployment, China perceived the action as a threat to its national security and in response 
executed economic statecraft to compel ROK behavior.  
3. How China Applied Economic Coercion 
Instead of employing military measures or a security buildup in the region, China 
employed a range of economic measures to hurt ROK’s economy after it deployed the 
THAAD. The measures include cutting tourism to ROK, cutting ROK imports, promoting 
boycotts of ROK goods, and using regulatory measures to close down Korean-owned 
companies in China.82 ROK’s tourism industry was hit the hardest. China’s National 
Tourism Administration discouraged trips to ROK by issuing travel warnings and 
informally banning the sale of ROK package tours.83 Violating the ban would result in 
fines or license revocation.84 The ban was enacted immediately across the country. Total 
tourism to ROK from China dropped about 50% from around 600,000 tourists per month 
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in January 2017 to around 300,000 per month for the rest of the year. The drop in tourism 
also impacted ROK airline companies, the hospitality sector and duty-free industries.85  
Chinese boycotts also targeted cuts in ROK imports in industries such as 
automobiles, cosmetics and popular music. Korean auto companies Hyundai and Kia saw 
their Chinese sales fall more than 30%, and their global sales dropped 8.7% that year.86 
Chinese consumers also boycotted Korean cosmetics and entertainment (popular music, 
television, movies). Lastly, Lotte, a Korean-owned market company that provided land for 
the THAAD deployment, experienced mass shutdowns in China for regulatory violations. 
According to multiple authors, China applied informal methods of stepping up selected 
regulatory measures to close almost 90 Lotte stores in China.87 
Chinese economic statecraft was shown fully sharpened as it was able to precisely 
target ROK industries while avoiding significant pain for China’s own economy. For 
example, China did not target many of ROK’s semiconductor industries, which are critical 
to Chinese technology.88 The value of ROK semiconductor exports still more than doubled 
during that year.89 Lim also pointed out that if China targeted the ROK semiconductor 
industry, it would have also hurt millions of Chinese workers employed in factories 
assembling the parts. Also, by effectively targeting Korean consumer businesses such as 
groceries and cosmetics, the damage was much greater to those selected vulnerable Korean 
industries, due to the loss of sales from the massive Chinese market, than to Chinese 
consumers losing access to those Korean businesses. 
4. Impact on ROK Policymaking  
Chinese economic coercion had a visible impact on the ROK economy in the short-
term but was negligible in the long-term. Harrell noted that during the episode, “The Bank 
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of Korea estimated the actions shaved almost half a percentage point off South Korean 
2017 growth. A South Korean research institute estimated in September 2017 that the cost 
to South Korea of the tourism restrictions alone could be over $15 billion.”90 The THAAD 
crisis approximately cost the ROK economy $7.5B in 2017 while the Chinese economy 
suffered a loss of $880M.91 However, since many other ROK industries, such as important 
semiconductors, remained undisrupted by China’s coercive actions, bilateral trade still 
actually increased by almost 15% in 2017.92 ROK likely felt immediate economic pressure 
from Chinese coercion which urged them to enter talks with Chinese counterparts. 
However, in regard to long-term economic relations, trade between the two countries was 
not only later restored to pre-THAAD levels, but grew even stronger. Later in 2017, despite 
threatening to do so earlier, ROK decided not to go forward with a complaint to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) regarding China’s economic coercive behavior. President 
Moon and business executives from top South Korean companies (ex. Samsung, Hyundai, 
Motor, LG, etc.) visited Beijing to discuss improving economic ties, strengthening 
cooperation and expanding cultural exchange.93  
ROK was diplomatically sensitive to Chinese coercive activities, however, it did 
not stop them from continuing forward with the THAAD deployment. The main reason for 
this was due to continued overall economic and diplomatic interaction between the two 
countries. High-level diplomatic exchanges, continued bilateral investment, renewed 
commercial ties including increased Chinese tourism, and further negotiations on the 
China-ROK FTA improved overall economic relations.94 These economic results revealed 
two things about China’s use of economic coercive actions: it displayed the flexibility of 
options China has to influence ROK behavior and the de-escalatory nature and 
recoverability of utilizing such actions. China likely avoided pursuing options that would 
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have caused larger economic warfare or long-term economic damage between the two 
countries. China’s coercive tactics were flexible enough where it could have scaled them 
back if ROK appeared to comply or cooperate with Chinese demands. ROK’s decision not 
to go forward with the WTO complaint also “suggested South Korea’s prioritization of 
diplomatic and economic cooperation with China.”95 Additionally, ROK likely feared 
losing China’s cooperation on influencing DPRK behavior.96 Separately, the THAAD 
crisis did cause ROK to look to diversify its trade in Southeast Asia in a likely attempt to 
reduce some of its dependency on the Chinese market.97  
In the case of THAAD, EI did help mitigate the conflict without resorting to 
military force. In order to relieve Chinese economic pressure and tensions on the peninsula, 
ROK entered talks with China and came to an agreement on October 31, 2017 to normalize 
relations. They came to an agreement called the Three No’s: no additional deployment of 
THAAD, no ROK integration into a U.S. regional missile defense system, and no trilateral 
alliance (United States and Japan).98 Chinese President Xi and South Korean President 
Moon agreed that coordination between China and ROK was “very effective in stabilizing 
the Northeast Asian region” and that “the time is ripening for resolving issues on the 
Korean peninsula.”99  EI has given China additional tools to reach its long-term strategic 
objectives without increasing militarization in the region. 
5. Effect on U.S. Security Alliance 
The THAAD deployment continued forward despite Chinese economic pressure 
but both China and ROK interpreted the end results differently. ROK refused to remove 
the THAAD from the country but in order to relieve Chinese economic pressure it came to 
an agreement with China on the Three No’s. Glaser analyzed statements in Oct 2017 from 
the Chinese Foreign Ministry who suggested that Seoul “caved to Chinese pressure” and 
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committed to the agreement. On the other hand, the ROK Foreign Minister explained the 
Three No’s as “not a promise made to China but, rather a statement of South Korea’s long-
standing position.”100 ROK wanted to publicly make sure that it did not appear sacrificing 
its national security and sovereignty with the negotiations. China also likely wanted to 
appear strong to its domestic constituents by displaying how it acted strongly in addressing 
a national security threat and was successful.  
Despite not achieving its tactical objective in removing the THAAD, it appears 
China was partially successful in achieving its strategic objective of complicating the 
integrity of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Even though the Sino-ROK agreement on the Three 
No’s was vague, future ROK-U.S. cooperation on missile defense and other security 
matters will likely be constrained. Years later, ROK is still scarred by the crisis which has 
created a feeling of vulnerability in the country.101 It will be more hesitant on taking action 
that may offend China even if that action aligns with its national security goals. This 
relationship dynamic has been exacerbated by the fact that the Sino-ROK economies have 
still been increasingly integrating since the crisis. This may complicate future ROK-U.S. 
cooperation and plans on deploying another THAAD missile system or U.S. efforts to place 
intermediate range missiles in ROK.102 
Increased South Korean support for security relations with the United States while 
decreased favorability for China are interesting trends to look out for. Some have suggested 
that the South Korean people felt betrayed by the United States due to the lack of economic 
help provided during the crisis.103 However, in a 2018 poll, two-thirds of South Koreans 
polled chose relations with the United States over China in the context of a Sino-U.S. 
rivalry.104 Another survey found that South Korean favorable views of China fell from 
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61% in 2015 (pre-THAAD crisis) to 34% in 2017.105 Seoul will be in the middle of facing 
increased pressure from Beijing on one side, and increased pressure from its domestic 
constituents and Washington on the other. 
Lastly, another effect of the THAAD crisis may be further complication to the 
trilateral US-ROK-Japan alliance. The Three No’s itself further complicates ROK’s role in 
the alliance and in a missile defense system with the United States and Japan. However, 
deteriorating ROK-Japan relations have been an ongoing trend. Historical grievances and 
fears of Japanese rearmament (supported by the United States) are issues ROK and China 
happen to both agree on and are concerned about.106 With issues such as ROK withdrawing 
from the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan, the 
United States will continue to have a difficult time keeping the alliance together. The 
THAAD crisis likely exacerbated an already ongoing deterioration of relations between 
ROK and Japan. 
D. LOOKING FORWARD 
China will likely consider using economic statecraft against ROK when it involves 
U.S. security cooperation especially when there are opportunities to protect Chinese 
strategic interests and weaken the alliance. China could use a range of economic tactics to 
influence ROK ranging from incentives to coercion. First, ongoing issues between ROK 
and the U.S. about the cost of stationing U.S. forces in ROK may be a strategic opportunity 
for China. One of China’s strategic goals is to reduce the presence and capabilities of U.S. 
military forces in the region. China could also persuade ROK to not continue or at least 
diminish joint military exercises with the United States in guise of or in accordance with 
committing to DPRK negotiations. Second, if a Taiwan conflict should arise in the future, 
China would look to diminish the U.S. ability to use ROK as a stationing site for operations. 
China would also want to deter ROK from supporting U.S. operations in the Indo-Pacific. 
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Lastly, China would likely desire ROK to not join the U.S. position on Huawei/ZTE 5G 
spying concerns and lockout. 
Human rights is another area wherein China is likely to utilize economic statecraft 
to influence ROK’s position. In 2000, due to Chinese and South Korean political pressure, 
ROK prevented a planned visit by the Dalai Lama. ROK did so in order in preparation of 
a visit by the Chinese premier at the time and in hopes of improving economic relations 
between the two countries.107 There has been no visit by Dalai Lama to the ROK for the 
past 20 years. This case was not analyzed in-depth for the thesis due to the lack of economic 
coercion and statecraft enacted by China. The lack of options it had at the time was mostly 
due to the Chinese economy’s smaller size (China needed ROK more then) and lack of EI 
with ROK. As we have seen with China’s use of economic statecraft against Norway and 
Mongolia in regard to controversial human rights issues, China could influence ROK from 
engaging in criticizing China’s handling of Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The THAAD crisis presents a case where Chinese economic coercion had an impact 
and disrupted U.S.-ROK security relations. China responded to the THAAD deployment 
by using exclusionary economic leverage to influence ROK behavior. These informal 
methods included popular boycotts, tourism restrictions, import restrictions, and increased 
regulatory measures. China was able to precisely targeted Korean industries that would 
hurt ROK more than China. These actions were not too damaging to either side’s economy 
and left a path for recovery if relations were to normalize. Despite agreeing to the Three 
No’s, the bedrock of the U.S.-ROK alliance still seems to remain intact as ROK provided 
vague commitments to China while allowing the THAAD to remain deployed. U.S.-ROK 
security relations will be further challenged going forward with growing Chinese power 
and Sino-ROK EI. The next chapter will examine how Chinese economic coercion 
impacted another Pacific country’s security relations with the United States, Australia.  
 
 




The continued rise of China in global and Asia-Pacific affairs has complicated and 
challenged the direction of Australian policy. Australia is considered to be an advanced 
developed state and middle power. It has been a longstanding U.S. ally and understanding 
its actions and mindset will be important going forward in working towards achieving a 
free and open Indo-Pacific. In the past 20 years, Australia’s response to a rising China has 
shifted from accommodating to challenging as it has strived to balance its economic and 
security interests. Economically, similar to ROK, China and Australia have had increasing 
economic interdependence and Australia sees its economic future dependent on having 
good relations with China. EI has increased prosperity between both countries but has also 
given China more economic tools for leverage. How has China’s use of economic coercive 
tools impacted Australia, and more importantly for the United States, its security relations 
with the United States?  
This chapter discusses how, in the past 20 years, China has applied economic 
coercion in multiple instances against Australia to challenge the cohesion of the U.S.-
Australia alliance to undermine security commitments related to Taiwan, South China Sea 
operations, and the banning of Huawei from national 5G networks. Its economic coercive 
tactics became more active and sophisticated over time due to the precise and flexible 
targeting. Towards the end of the chapter, the research examines a notable case where 
China did not utilize economic coercion against Australia–the U.S. continuous deployment 
of marines at Darwin. Australia accepting the deployment is against Chinese interests, 
caused a negative public reaction from the Chinese state, and has obvious U.S.-Australia 
security implications. Overall, the study finds that Chinese economic coercion has not 
detrimentally impacted the strength of the U.S.-Australia alliance and may have actually 
increased Australian resistance to Chinese demands.  
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B. ECONOMIC TRENDS AND DATA 
Trade between Australia and China has consistently increased between 2000–2018, 
and Australia sees its economic future dependent on having good relations with China. In 
2000, Chinese trade made up about $5.5B or 7.75% of all Australian imports, and made up 
$3B or 4.64% of all Australian exports.108 By 2018, these numbers had significantly 
jumped  as Chinese trade made up $57.5B or 24.57% of all Australian imports, and $87.7B 
or 34.71% of all Australian exports.109 China became both Australia’s largest export 
market and source of imports. According to the Australia China Business Council, “the 
average Australian household generates an additional $3,400ASD a year from trade with 
China.”110 Gill and Jakobson noted that Australia’s exports to China are worth more than 
its exports to the United States, Germany, South Korea, France, Canada and all of 
Southeast Asia combined.111 
While China is a strong trading partner for Australia, Australia is not quite as central 
to Beijing. In 2000, Australian trade made up about $5B or 2.05% of all Chinese imports, 
and made up $3.4B or 1.38% of all Chinese exports.112 By 2018, trade numbers modestly 
rose and value significantly increased as Australian trade made up about $105B or 5.28% 
of all Chinese imports, and made up $47.5B or 1.91% of all Chinese exports.113 Australia 
is China’s 13th largest export market and 6th largest source of imports. In the agricultural 
sector, however, Australia’s importance to China may be growing: China’s growing middle 
class means an increasing demand for meat. The “average Chinese diet is already very rich 
and meat-intensive” creating a boom for Australian agriculture.114 Also, between 2013 and 
2016, Australia’s export of services to China went up 50%.115  
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In 2007, China overtook Japan as Australia’s largest trading partner and, in 2009, 
it became Australia’s largest export market.116 China also sends large numbers of tourists 
and students to Australia.. Chinese tourists spend about $11B ASD per year in Australia.117 
Education-wise, Chinese students are almost 40% of foreign enrollees into Australia’s 
universities, and provide almost a third of the revenue overall.118 
Increased Chinese demand for energy has helped propel a mining boom in 
Australia. Thomas noted that, “by 2012, the three largest component trades were iron ore, 
coal and gold. Trade in these three components accounted for 37.2% of all [Australian] 
exports.”119 Iron ore is critical to fueling China’s massive domestic and overseas 
infrastructure construction and steel industry. Additionally, Australia’s uranium and 
natural gas reserves have become progressively attractive to China. 
Investment between both countries continue to occur, and although fears of 
overwhelming Chinese investment into the Australian economy are mostly overblown, 
public perception of this issue is challenging the relationship. From 2006–2016, China 
accounted for only 6% of total foreign investment into Australia.120 The United States and 
United Kingdom are larger sources of foreign investment into the country.121 In 2013, 95% 
of Chinese investment was mostly in metals and energy but by 2015, that dropped to 30% 
and investment was diversified into real estate, agriculture, transport, tourism and 
health.122 Gill noted that the vast majority of Chinese investment into Australia are 
reviewed and approved by the Foreign Investment Review Board. However, a few high-
profile cases have provoked Australian concerns about Chinese investment. In a 2012 
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Lowy Institute poll, 54% of Australians polled agreed that China seeking to buy Australian 
mining and agricultural companies was not desirable and the industries should be kept in 
Australian hands.123 With the Belt Road Initiative, Chinese demand for steel is insatiable 
and China has also been increasingly exporting telecommunications and tech equipment to 
Australia.  
EI is clear and prominent between the two countries, but overall, China is much 
more important to the Australian economy than the other way around. Australia’s EI and 
trade with China was a major factor behind its ability to go through the devastating effects 
of the 2008 global financial crisis while the West struggled.124 According to a 2012 Lowy 
Institute poll, 70% of Australians polled agreed that Chinese economic ties were critical 
for Australia beating the 2008 crisis.125 While Australia’s economic prosperity and future 
is heavily dependent on China, this dependency dynamic also makes it uncomfortable. This 
trade dynamic will heavily influence Australia’s relationship with China and its 
accommodating approach to Chinese issues.  
C. IDENTIFYING AUSTRALIA’S INTERESTS 
While economic factors are the primary reasons why Australia has sought friendly 
relations with China, diplomatic and security interests also play a significant role in 
Australian policymaking calculus. Diplomatically, Australia’s objective is that China 
becomes an important and responsible stakeholder and supporter of the standing 
international rules-based order. During 2007 to 2010, then Australian Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd wanted to “encourage China’s active participation in efforts to maintain, develop and 
become integrally engaged in global and regional institutions, structures and norms.”126 
The objective was to deter a rising China from pursuing revisionist and disruptive behavior 
and have it more inclined to respect and primarily solve disputes through international 
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forums. Ideally, this would have also increased transparency and reduced uncertainty and 
illegitimacy of Chinese actions. 
Security concerns have complicated Sino-Australian economic relations as 
Australia is also concerned about maintaining its security relations with the United States. 
Thomas, Boutin, and Reilly argue that economics has played a significant role in 
increasingly forcing Australia into pursuing a “bifurcated foreign policy” with the United 
States and China.127 One focuses on economic development while the other focuses on 
security needs. Australia sees its security heavily dependent on maintaining relations with 
the United States but also has growing fears about China’s power and U.S. credibility for 
defense.128 Additionally, while China may seek to reduce Australia’s access and influence 
in the SCS, Australia is looking to increase them.129  
D. IDENTIFYING CHINA’S INTERESTS 
As with ROK, in order to promote its own development, economic objectives have 
been an important and consistent reason for China’s engagement with Australia. Since 
China’s reopening to the world in the 1970s, it has been seeking to promote its economic 
development and prosperity by expanding trade relations around the world. The engine of 
China’s economic development is fueled by its significant demand for energy. In 2010, 
almost 40% of China’s $80B worth of iron ore was imported from Australia.130 Australian 
businesses and universities provide another avenue for technology transfers, a high priority 
for China as it tries to overcome the middle-income trap. Joint ventures between Australian 
and Chinese businesses advance developments in technology.131 Finally, Australia is a 
part of China’s major global infrastructure project known as the Belt Road Initiative (BRI). 
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China has sought to build and invest in infrastructure in Australia’s Northern Territory in 
order to have it be a part of the maritime silk road.  
China has become significantly more prominent in global affairs and multilateral 
institutions and has sought to increase its influence over regional countries such as 
Australia. In the past, China has approached international relations with the mindset of 
promoting good-neighbor relations, which creates a favorable environment for its 
development.132 By engaging more in multilateral and regional institutions such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), China can promote and secure its interests abroad. According to 
Medcalf, Australia “is an outspoken and independent power in the Indo-Pacific, whose 
criticism and solidarity-building resistance to Chinese power is noted and potentially 
followed by others.”133 By closely engaging Australia through multilateral institutions and 
bilateral discussions, China could look to attain its support or at least its passiveness in 
international affairs. 
Finally, security objectives are important factors in China’s policy decision-making 
calculus towards Australia who is an important U.S. ally. China’s 2019 Defense White 
Paper mentioned apprehensively “Australia continues to strengthen its military alliance 
with the United States and its military engagement in the Asia-Pacific, seeking a bigger 
role in security affairs.”134 Moreover, Australia and the United States have a close military 
and intelligence sharing relationship. They are both concerned about and are preparing to 
meet a rising China. China perceives these actions as threats and does not want to be 
surrounded by hostile neighbors that are aligned with a hostile United States.135 China 
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would like to drive a wedge between the U.S.-Australia alliance. Also, territorial claims in 
the SCS are important to China. While Australia does not have a territorial claim in the 
waters, China would rather limit Australia’s access and influence in the region in order to 
reduce any unified or substantial resistance to its own claims.136 In short, China looks to 
expand its trade relations and influence over countries in the region which includes 
Australia. The next three sections will cover cases of China’s use of economic coercion 
against Australia that have also challenged U.S.-Australia security relations. 
E. TAIWAN CASE STUDY, 2003–2005 
This section will cover China applying economic coercion against Australia to 
influence its position on Taiwan during the mid-2000s. The first part will cover how China 
applied economic coercion against Australia and followed by its impact on Australian 
policymaking. Finally, there will be analysis section to see if the economic coercive actions 
had any effect on Australia’s security relations with the United States. 
1. How China Applied Economic Coercion 
China used the backdrop of negotiations for a China-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement (CHAFTA) to influence Australia into pursuing actions that placated to 
Beijing’s position on Taiwan. In October 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited 
Australia and signed an agreement to begin studying the prospect of an FTA. During Hu’s 
address to Australia’s Parliament, he “urged Australia to play a constructive role in the 
peaceful reunification of China and Taiwan, stressing the threat to regional peace came 
from pro-independence elements on the island.”137 Taiwan is a highly sensitive issue for 
Beijing, considering it to be a runaway province and a domestic issue that should not 
involve foreign parties. Both Harrell and Feigenbaum would categorize China dangling the 
prospect of a trade agreement fitting under “attractive economic measures” and “passive 
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economic leverage” in China’s economic statecraft playbook.138Australia would have 
benefitted immensely if an FTA could be established between the two countries, giving 
Australian mineral and agricultural exports even greater access to the large Chinese market. 
Australia backing China on Taiwan or at least being silent or unsupportive of the  
U.S. position on the matter, would significantly challenge the U.S.-Australian alliance. In 
the event of a conflict in the Taiwan strait, a lack of Australian material, diplomatic  
and military support would weaken U.S. efforts to counter China and damage U.S.-
Australian relations. 
2. Impact on Australian Policymaking 
Later in August 2004, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer visited 
Beijing to discuss the FTA, at which time he made public responses that placated Beijing 
regarding its position on Taiwan. He downplayed the Chinese military threat calling it a 
“disincentive for Taiwan to declare independence,” while putting more blame on Taipei 
potentially threatening stability by declaring independence.139 Australia, as requested by 
Beijing, criticized then-Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian for his push for more 
independence.140 When pressed if Australia would support the U.S. defense of Taiwan 
under the ANZUS treaty, Downer shied away from committing to that prospect. Downer 
stated that the treaty would be “invoked in the event of one our two countries, Australia or 
the United States, being attacked. So, some military activity elsewhere in the world, be it 
in Iraq or anywhere else for that matter does not automatically invoke the ANZUS 
Treaty.”141 
After experiencing immediate negative reactions from its allies, the Australian 
government had to retrace its steps and resolidify its defense commitments. The United 
States found Downer’s remarks as “puzzling” while Taiwan found them “lacking moral 
 
138 Feigenbaum, “Is Coercion the New Normal in China’s Economic Statecraft?”; Harrell, Rosenberg, 
and Sarvalle, “China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures,” 6. 
139 Atkinson, Australia and Taiwan, 82. 
140 He, “Politics of Accommodation of the Rise of China.” 
141 Atkinson, Australia and Taiwan, 82; He, “Politics of Accommodation of the Rise of China,” 64. 
45 
courage.”142 Prime Minister Howard later reclarified Australia’s position by stating 
Australia and the United States “must come to each other’s aid when under attack or 
involved in a conflict.”143 In 2005, China received strong objections from the United States 
and Taiwan after it enacted the Anti-Secession Law which authorized China to use non-
peaceful means against a Taiwan independence movement.144 With upcoming visits to 
Beijing by the Prime Minister and Trade Minister to discuss a FTA, Australia tried to avoid 
discussing the possibility of cross-strait conflict and made ambiguous remarks about 
Australia committing to the conflict.145 
3. Effect on U.S. Security Alliance 
Australia’s contradictory and ambiguous remarks about its commitment to the 
ANZUS Treaty in a Taiwan-conflict scenario confused the United States. In 2005, a senior 
Bush Administration official told a news reporter that China was using “its economic 
relationship with Australia as leverage on political and strategic issues” and “Australia 
wasn’t getting American policy on China.”146 However, it is likely Australia’s tepid 
position with the United States on Taiwan during this period was meant to help facilitate 
FTA negotiations with China while avoiding any concrete changes to the U.S.-Australian 
alliance. A senior official in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded the Australian 
government review ANZUS in regard to a Taiwan-conflict but Downer responded 
“Australia was very satisfied with the Treaty,” reconfirming Australia’s commitment to the 
alliance without directly speaking to the issue of its application to a conflict over 
Taiwan.147 This case revealed an early scenario where China used economic statecraft in 
an attempt to influence a U.S. ally’s decision making in regard to security matters. While 
Australia’s position to support the United States in an event of a Taiwan conflict seemed 
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vague at times, Australia publicly reconfirmed the alliance and there appeared to be no 
long-term changes to the alliance. China’s use of economic coercion in this case seemed 
ineffective. 
F. AUSTRALIA’S TOUGHER STANCE, 2016–2020: FOREIGN 
INTERFERENCE AND SOUTH CHINA SEA CASE STUDY 
This section will cover China applying economic coercion against Australia in 
regard to Australia’s more assertive responses to recent Chinese activities. These activities 
pertain to Chinese interference in Australia’s domestic politics and the South China Sea. It 
is in the interest of the United States that one of its strongest allies in the region remain 
independent and resistant of foreign influence, and that they are both on the same page on 
regional security issues. The first part will cover how China applied economic coercion 
against Australia and followed by its impact on Australian policymaking. Finally, there 
will be analysis section to see if the economic coercive actions had any effect on Australia’s 
security relations with the United States.  
1. How China Applied Economic Coercion 
Australia’s tougher stance against China in the second half of the decade included 
attention to China’s militarization of the South China Sea (SCS) and interference in 
Australian politics. From 2006–2016, Australia saw a persistent rise in Chinese donations 
to Australian political parties.148 A famous case in 2016, where a Chinese billionaire 
property developer was caught providing donations to Australian politicians and parties, 
and threatened to cancel donations if they did not soften their stance on the SCS.149 At the 
time, such donations were legal. In 2018, Australia passed its “Foreign Interference Laws” 
to combat primarily Chinese interference in Australian politics. These laws characterized 
foreign interference as covert, coercive or corrupt means to shape Australian politics, and 
led to policy responses including banning foreign donations, increasing transparency of 
working behalf of foreign governments, and toughening sanctions and enforcement.150 
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Additionally, Australia started backing away from its previous hesitancy on calling out 
China for its disruptive SCS activities including island building and use of military gray-
zone tactics.  
China responded to Australia’s tougher stance with coercive economic measures 
that included trade and tourism restrictions. In September 2016, likely in response to 
Australia’s criticism of China’s activities in the SCS, China restricted Australian 
pasteurized milk imports.151 In 2018, likely in response to the recently enacted foreign 
interference laws and new warnings against Chinese behavior in the SCS, Chinese 
regulation held up Australian wine and beef exports leading to a halt of hundreds of 
millions of dollars in trade.152 Australian wine, beef and barely exports make up about 
$4.4B or roughly 10% of all Australian exports to China.153 It is difficult to quantify the 
impact of Chinese trade restrictions on Australia as the disputes are ongoing. Interruptions 
to exports are inconsistent and Australian industries have somewhat been able to adapt (ex. 
Australian barely being sold in other markets outside of China).154 Later in 2018, the 
Chinese government restricted travel for Australian journalists and officials.155 
Additionally, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has warned Chinese students to be cautious 
when in Australia–likely also an attempt to threaten and hurt the Australian university 
system.156 Australian education of Chinese students is about $12.1B or roughly 25% of all 
Australian exports to China.157 At the time, Chinese enrollment in Australian universities 
seemed consistent despite the warnings, however, this is expected to change significantly 
due to the effects of COVID-19 and further disputes between the two nations. 
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2. Impact on Australian Policymaking 
Australia’s tougher stance on China has undoubtedly increased tension between the 
two countries. Chinese economic coercion has been an important factor in Canberra’s 
policymaking calculus. In 2019, the Australian government was cautious about publicly 
attributing the source of a cyberattack on parliament and an “internal investigation of the 
incident reportedly recommended against public disclosure out of concern that it would 
upset trade ties with China.”158 Still, Australia has currently maintained its stance on both 
the foreign interference laws and in the SCS. Recently in June 2020, Prime Minister 
Morrison affirmed that Australia won’t be intimidated by CCP threats and won’t give up 
its values.159 Despite toughening and more frequent use of economic coercion by China, 
Australia so far is still pressing forward with protecting its own sovereignty and strategic 
interests in the region.  
3. Effect on U.S. Security Alliance 
Chinese economic coercion has not significantly impacted Australia’s security 
alliance with the United States. In actuality, after previously being hesitant on calling out 
China for its activities and militarization of the SCS, Australia changed its tone and joined 
the United States. In July 2020, Chinese state-run media issued a threat to Australia after 
it released a joint statement with the United States condemning China’s maritime claims in 
the SCS.160 Australia taking stronger action to maintain its sovereignty against Chinese 
interference in effect strengthens the alliance. An Australia that is more resilient from 
Chinese influence means it will be able to act more independently and ideally side with the 
United States in pursuit of common interests in the region such as maintaining norms and 
an international rules-based order.  
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G. HUAWEI 5G CASE STUDY 
This section will cover China applying economic coercion against Australia as a 
response to Australia’s banning of the Chinese tech giant Huawei from developing its 5G 
network. The first part will cover how China applied economic coercion against Australia 
and followed by its impact on Australian policymaking. Finally, there will be analysis 
section to see if the economic coercive actions had any effect on Australia’s security 
relations with the United States. 
1. How China Applied Economic Coercion 
Due to fears of espionage and privacy concerns from the Chinese government, 
Australia banned Chinese telecommunication giants Huawei and ZTE from its 5G network. 
5G is considered to be a disruptive technology that will significantly improve the 
performance and efficiency of information communication infrastructure. Chinese 
companies Huawei and ZTE have made significant developments in the field of 5G. 
Australia would have benefitted from them greatly if they were allowed to develop and 
maintain Australia’s 5G network. However, the 2017 Chinese National Security Law 
requires companies in China to comply with Chinese intelligence services. Western 
intelligence agencies including from the FIVE EYES community, that comprises of 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United Kingdom and the United States, warned their 
governments about risks associated with Huawei and ZTE. The Australian government was 
the first FIVE EYES member to ban the Chinese companies from its 5G network taking 
the lead in highlighting the threat of Chinese interference and intelligence collection. 
China responded to the ban with an array of actions including detention of 
Australian citizens, issuing strong statements, a diplomatic freeze and trade restrictions. In 
March 2017, the Chinese government prevented a 2-year-old Australian citizen and his 
Australian-visa carrying mother from leaving Xinjiang Province. The Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute (ASPI) cited multiple academic and human rights experts who believe their 
detention was used for “hostage diplomacy in response to diplomatic tensions over a range 
of issues, including Australia’s Huawei ban and criticism of China’s exploitation of Uyghur 
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minority in Xinjiang.”161 In August 2018, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce stated it was 
the wrong decision for Australia to ban Huawei and warned that “if Sino-Australian 
economic ties are hurt, Australia is the one that will bear more losses, not China.”162 Later 
in February 2019, it was reported that Australian coal imports were experiencing 
significant delays entering China.163 Coal makes up about $13.8B or roughly 29% of all 
Australian exports to China.164 There came multiple reports of delays and cancelled 
purchases from Chinese companies of Australian coal.165 The Australian government is 
still assessing the impact of Chinese economic coercive actions, however, so far it seems 
that Australian coal exports to China are continuing and have even slightly increased in the 
first half of 2020.166  
2. Impact on Australian Policymaking 
Chinese coercive responses to the ban actually strengthened Australian support for 
it. According to Searight, China’s coercive actions not only failed to weaken public support 
for Australia’s tough stance, it actually backfired and swung public opinion against 
China.167 Delays in developing a 5G network clearly works against improving the 
Australian economy, however, here was another case in Australia where strategic interests 
took precedent over economic interests. Having strong public opinion will strengthen the 
resolve of the Australian government to continue enforcing the ban, however, China 
continuing to make vast strides ahead of others in 5G development and lay out may further 
pressure the Australian economy and state. 
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3. Effect on U.S. Security Alliance 
The United States supports Australia’s 5G ban on Huawei and ZTE and later 
followed suit in implementing its own ban. While Australia’s ban of the Chinese companies 
was primarily aimed at protecting its national sovereignty, Australia also likely considered 
the impact the ban would have on its security relationships with its closest allies. As part 
of the FIVE EYES community, Australia and the United States have a close intelligence-
sharing relationship that also requires having connected and interoperable IT infrastructure. 
If Australia or any member of FIVE EYES allowed Chinese companies to work on and 
gain access to their IT infrastructure, this would challenge the integrity and confidence of 
the intelligence-sharing relationship. At the time of the writing of this thesis, New Zealand 
and recently the United Kingdom has also banned Huawei from its 5G network with 
Canada expected to follow. Australia’s actions in this case have strengthened or at least 
maintained the integrity of the alliance.  
H. NOTABLE CASE WHERE CHINA DID NOT UTILIZE ECONOMIC 
COERCION AGAINST AUSTRALIA: DARWIN 
In 2011, China expressed dismay at Australia for allowing the United States to 
continuously deploy marines at Darwin but ultimately did not pursue major repercussions 
against Australia. Since President Obama’s visit to Australia in 2011, about 1,200 U.S. 
marines have been deployed to the Australian northern city of Darwin as a part of the U.S. 
pivot to Asia. Australian businesses, former government officials, former diplomats, retired 
military officers, and foreign policy analysts outspokenly questioned the government’s 
decision in allowing the visit and deployment of U.S. troops.168 The Chinese Foreign 
Ministry spokesman stated “the global economy was in a rocky state and questioned 
whether now was a smart time for Australia to make a new agreement with the United 
States.169 China perceived the renewed U.S. attention in the region as a response or check 
to its global rise. More specifically, China sees the expansion of American military forces 
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operating in the region as a threat to its interests and efforts. Chinese state-run media, 
including the Global Times, suggested Australia could be caught in a “cross-fire” and 
should be cautious with allowing bases for the United States to use against China.170  
Despite this rhetoric from China, no known follow up actions were taken against 
Australia. Even later in 2013, Prime Minister Julia Gillard visited China and announced a 
new strategic partnership and established an annual leadership dialogue with China. 
Eighteen months later, both countries established CHAFTA after Australia satisfied 
Beijing’s desire by joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).171 It is 
possible that China did not want to scrap CHAFTA and waste a decade of negotiations. 
Also, China saw how the benefits of further EI with Australia could outweigh the benefits 
of punishing Australia or risk pushing Australia closer into the arms of the United States. 
Finally, China likely did not want to risk the potential of escalating tensions with the United 
States if it took action to punish Australia. The United States could have interpreted such 
Chinese actions as aggressive and threatening, thus justifying its renewed focused in the 
region. 
I. LOOKING FORWARD 
There are two areas where China’s application of economic coercion could impact 
U.S.-Australian security relations: COVID-19 and human rights. First, recently with 
COVID-19, both Australia and the United States have been calling for an independent 
inquiry into the origins of the virus. The Chinese ambassador to Australia warned Australia 
of China boycotting Australian services and agricultural goods if they continue to push for 
the investigation. China later backed up the threats by imposing an 80% import tax on 
Australian barely and suspending some beef imports.172 This case was not included in the 
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thesis because it did not have a direct connection to impacting U.S.-Australian security 
relations. However, that may change if the United States and Australia take a stronger 
stance together on pushing for an independent inquiry and if it has further security 
implications.  
Second, China could initiate greater coercive actions, including economic, against 
Australia if it continues to challenge China’s human rights record particularly in Xinjiang, 
Hong Kong and Tibet. The Australian government in the past generally avoided criticizing 
China’s human rights violations and accommodated its narrative particularly in regard to 
the Dalai Lama and Tibet. Recently, Australia has aligned with the United States in calling 
out Chinese violations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong.173 China has responded with 
diplomatic restrictions and strong statements. However, this may later include economic 
coercive tactics as alluded to by the Director of the Australian Studies Centre at East Chia 
normal University who warned that, “Although China would prefer not to use trade 
exchanges as leverage, strained China-Australia ties and rising anti-China sentiment in 
Australia would discourage economic exchanges.”174 
Chinese economic coercion so far has seemingly done little to deter Australia from 
pursuing interests that are contrary to China’s. China may have underestimated Australian 
resistance to Chinese economic incentives and coercion. Additionally, China may have 
overplayed its hand with economic coercive tactics as it has sharply increased Australian 
public suspicion and unfavorable views against it. China’s greatest economic leverage over 
Australia is iron ore but China cannot threaten the export without hurting its own economic 
engine or BRI. Australian political leaders have stated that an “eyes wide open approach” 
is necessary going forward in future engagements with China.175 In June 2020, the 
Morrison Administration announced $186B in defense spending for the next 10 years 
which is a 40% increase from the previous budget allocated for that time period.176 In a 
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July 2020 speech, Prime Minister Morrison stated that his country “must face the reality 
that we have moved into a new and less benign strategic era.”  
J. CONCLUSION 
In multiple instances, China’s use of economic coercion against Australia has 
challenged the U.S.-Australia alliance’s cohesion, however, no long-term clear changes 
were achieved by China and it appears the actions have only exacerbated Sino-Australian 
tensions. Its economic coercive tactics became more active and sophisticated over time as 
it challenged Australia’s security commitment to the United States in event of a Taiwan 
conflict, its toughening stance against China in the SCS and foreign interference, and 
Huawei 5G ban. For the past 20 years, Australia has attempted to balance its economic and 
security interests with a rising China by shifting its foreign policy approach from 
accommodating to challenging Beijing. Economic dependency and prosperity are the 
major drivers behind Australia’s open and placating approach to China. The relationship 
has been complicated by Australia’s security concerns with China’s growing assertiveness 
and use of economic coercion, political interference, regional territorial disputes, human 
rights violations and health concerns. Going forward, Australia will be increasingly 
strained in being able to challenge disruptive Chinese actions while avoiding significant 
damage onto its own economy.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
This thesis has five main findings that present mixed results regarding the impacts 
of China’s recent use of economic coercion. These conclusions are the result of detailed 
study of cases of coercive policies against the ROK and Australia, and an assessment of 
their effect on security relations with the United States. The research has also analyzed and 
referenced other cases of Chinese economic coercion in the past 10 years to contrast and 
compare trends and tactics. Previously, China may have avoided using economic coercion 
as a viable tactic due to its lack of options and its own dependence on trade. Later, as China 
reopened to the world, Beijing was primarily focused on improving relations and trade in 
order to promote economic development. Most recently, as China’s power has grown, it 
appears to have become more willing to accept modest costs in forgone trade for strategic 
reasons. The thesis’ core findings are as follows. 
First, Chinese economic coercive tactics have grown more active and sophisticated 
overtime, and Beijing is more inclined to use them. The sophistication of China’s options 
went from using attractive and passive measures (e.g. economic incentives such as a free 
trade agreement) to more active measures incorporating more direct state involvement and 
integrating with other forms of statecraft (diplomatic and military). After China received a 
global negative reaction for restricting exports of rare-earth metals to Japan in 2010, 
Chinese economic targeting became more measured. China’s array of economic options 
and tactics include popular boycotts, tourism restrictions, imports restrictions, and 
regulatory measures. Many of these options uses informal methods to influence 
commercial actors to act in favor of the Chinese state. This gives the state plausible 
deniability and avoids direct responsibility. China is likely to continue using economic 
coercive tactics due to its deterrence value, other states’ higher dependency on the Chinese 
market, and ability to avoid more escalatory measures such as use of military force. 
Second, while some short-term economic pain is experienced for both the target 
country and China (to a lesser extent), generally overall long-term economic relations 
56 
between the two continue to prosper. Chinese economic coercive tactics have grown to 
become more precise. That is,  they are able to swiftly target specific industries rather than 
conduct a broad-brush economic attack. The tactics are also designed in a way where the 
damage is greater to the targeted state than to China. For example, China did not target 
ROK semiconductors and avoided heavy targeting of Australia’s iron ore industry as both 
are critical to the Chinese economy. The attacks also do not reach a threshold of no-return. 
As we have seen in the cases with ROK, Australia, Philippines, Norway and Mongolia, the 
informal nature and flexibility of China’s coercive actions also allows the targeted country 
to recover economic relations if they begin to cooperate with China. China wants to 
maintain the economic relationships with the states for its own economic development and 
to maintain its leverage over the state. In both ROK and Australia, their overall trade with 
China continued to grow despite the crises. 
Third, China’s use of economic coercive tactics was partially effective but did not 
create concrete and clear changes to ROK’s and Australia’s security relations with the 
United States. In ROK and Australia, leaders provided vague commitments or statements 
regarding their negotiations with China. They later re-clarified and reconfirmed their 
security commitments to the United States. Australia even committed to more U.S.-led 
efforts in many cases in response to Chinese coercion. However, Chinese coercion will 
increasingly complicate the alliances’ integrity in the future if China’s economic might, 
technological advances and economic interdependence with the countries continue to 
grow. ROK’s and Australia’s trade dependency with China will make it more difficult for 
them to hedge against it especially if the United States is not engaged. Increasing 
competition between China and the United States may pressure both ROK and Australia to 
decide which power they will have to more heavily lean on.  
Fourth, China’s economic coercion against the targeted countries seemed more 
effective if it aligned with the targeted countries’ security interests. ROK officials were 
more likely impacted by worsening relations with China not only for economic reasons but 
also because of concerns about a third party, the DPRK. The ROK did not want to lose 
China’s support and influence over DPRK behavior. Growing rifts in ROK-Japan relations, 
while favoring Chinese interests, have also been ongoing separate Chinese economic 
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pressure. In regards to Taiwan policy, Australia likely received Chinese economic coercion 
more strongly due to Canberra’s hesitancy in being engaged in a hypothetical cross-Strait 
conflict. In contrast, when China conducted disruptive activities in the SCS and in 
Australian politics, Australia saw them as threats to its national security and was more 
resilient and sterner against Chinese economic coercion. When it comes to impacting 
security relations, Chinese economic coercion seems to amplify preexisting trends. 
Finally, results suggest that China using economic coercion can be harmful against 
its own regional interests in the long-run. Chinese use of economic coercion has sharply 
raised ROK’s and Australia’s public opinion against it. As we have seen in the case 
chapters, both South Korean and Australian populations were polled following China’s use 
of economic coercion and saw a significant spike in unfavorable views against China. 
Other polls also showed that their populations had strong support for their countries’ 
security relations with the United States. Both ROK and Australia have looked to diversify 
their trade elsewhere (ex. Southeast Asia) to lessen their dependency on China. During the 
crises, they both have publicly stated that they will not sacrifice their countries’ national 
security over negotiations with China. Australia has recently dedicated more attention and 
spending towards its military and self-defense capabilities. 
The study has also found some important differences between ROK’s and 
Australia’s response to Chinese economic coercion. From 2010-2020, Australia took 
on a more challenging approach to China while ROK’s approach has been more 
accommodating. This may be due to differences in both countries’ strategic alignment with 
China. ROK’s top strategic concern is mitigating threats and disruption from DPRK. China 
shares this strategic interest with ROK.  ROK requires Beijing’s cooperation and influence 
in managing DPRK behavior and may scale back its security cooperation with the United 
States in order to acquire it. On the other hand, Australia’s strategic interests have not 
aligned with China’s. Both want a stable Asia-Pacific region but have different visions and 
approaches in getting there. Australia aligning with the United States in supporting a free 
and open Indo-Pacific, and condemning Chinese SCS activities and human rights 
violations, is being perceived by Beijing as threats to its core interests.  
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B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The United States should support ROK’s and Australia’s sovereignty and ability to 
act independently by working together and firmly responding to all Chinese coercive 
activities–including economic. The United States have enjoyed the protections, leverage 
and freedoms associated with the largest economy in the world and are more resilient of 
Chinese economic coercion, however, its allies do not have the same advantages and are 
more vulnerable. The integrity and strength of U.S. security relations with these countries 
are at risk and thus so is American strategic interests. The United States cannot be effective 
and successful in preserving its interests in the Asia-Pacific without its allies. The 
following are policy recommendations the United States can pursue to reinforce its regional 
alliances and strategic interests. 
• The United States should join with other countries to increase global 
awareness about economic coercion and create international norms 
about the use of sanctions. Economic coercion is not as emphasized as 
security or diplomatic coercion in meetings and hearings at higher levels 
of government and multilateral institutions. Bringing this topic forward 
and featuring it will increase global awareness and understanding. Also, 
working with and involving other countries, including China, to establish 
international norms for the use of sanctions would better attribute bad 
behavior and dissuade the use of informal methods that provide plausible 
deniability. This will be difficult and complicated for the United States as 
it has heavily relied on using targeted sanctions to pursue its own strategic 
goals. However, it will be in the best interest of the United States going 
forward as U.S. economic competitiveness is met or possibly surpassed by 
China’s. The risks can also be mitigated by making use of established and 
recognized international institutions in the conduct of such sanctions 
(rather than recourse to unilateral sanctions, which are less likely to be 
effective in any event). Countries will be less likely and effective at 
applying informal economic coercion when there are clear punishments 
enforced collectively by a larger community 
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• Increase support to allies immediately affected by Chinese economic 
coercion. The United States should consider providing economic relief to 
its allies when they are targeted by Chinese economic coercion especially 
when it involves U.S. security interests. This will relieve pressure from the 
allied countries and help them not give in to Chinese demands. 
Additionally, it will increase U.S. credibility amongst the eyes of the ally’s 
government and population. As we have seen in the THAAD crisis, many 
South Koreans saw the lack of U.S. support as a betrayal. The United 
States needs to win the hearts and minds of its allied populations if it 
wants the support of their governments 
• Create an allied arrangement that focuses on identifying and 
collectively responding to Chinese economic coercive activities. The 
United States already has a close security and intelligence partnership with 
Australia and ROK. The United States should similarly extend the nature 
of this security commitment to the economic sphere. When an allied 
member is under economic attack by China, the alliance should come 
together to prepare an appropriate and comprehensive joint response 
• Increase public-private cooperation to build resiliency against 
Chinese economic coercion. The United States should foster closer 
cooperation with American businesses and should encourage ROK and 
Australia to do the same with their businesses. First, private businesses 
should diversify their markets and supply chains where they can and be 
prepared for disruption to their commercial operations in case of another 
economic episode occurring with China. Similar to the mechanisms of 
information sharing and cooperation when a private entity is cyber-
attacked by a foreign entity, there should be mechanisms to increase 
information sharing and support when a foreign entity conducts economic 
coercion against private entities.  
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• Advance U.S. technological superiority. The country that will dominate 
the 21st century will be the one who has the edge in advance technologies. 
The U.S. needs to do what it can, whether through protecting intellectual 
property or funding projects, to make sure its technology sector is superior 
in areas such as artificial intelligence, 5G, quantum computing, 
blockchain, etc. They clearly not only have important security 
implications but economic ones as well. China dominating in these areas 
will increase the attraction and strength of the Chinese economy and will 
make it increasingly difficult for countries and businesses to resist. Thus, 
it is imperative for the U.S. to remain (regain) the lead in these sorts of 
key technologies, both to enable the use of U.S. advantage in its own 
(multilateral) economic sanctions policies, but also to deny China the 
ability to do the same in its (unilateral) approach 
C. OUTLOOK  
Looking ahead, without the mitigating responses discussed above, the United States 
and its allies should be concerned because U.S. dominance in the economic sphere is 
slowly ceding to China. China is on track to surpass the U.S. economy in overall size in 
the future and the United States will increasingly find it difficult to check Chinese actions. 
For over one hundred years, the United States has always had the economic advantage over 
its adversaries. This same dynamic cannot be assured going forward. China will likely have 
more economic power and will increasingly use it to pursue its strategic objectives. There 
will be more uncertainty about economic, security and diplomatic relations in the region 
between China, the United States and its allied countries. This could lead to further 
degradation of U.S. credibility and countries being less inclined to align with U.S. efforts. 
American efforts that are at stake include a rules-based order that promotes regional 
stability, freedom of navigation, protection of sovereignty for the people of Taiwan, Central 
and South Asia, and broad norms protecting human rights. 
 
61 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Apple Podcasts. “The Diplomat | Asia Geopolitics: The Origins and Drivers of 
Australia’s 2020 Defense Strategic Update on Apple Podcasts.” Accessed July 14, 
2020. https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/origins-drivers-australias-2020-
defense-strategic-update/id852773346?i=1000484277519. 
Atkinson, Joel. Australia and Taiwan: Bilateral Relations, China, the United States, and 
the South Pacific. Leiden: BRILL, 2012. 
Australian Embassy in China. “Economic and Trade Relations.” Accessed June 7, 2020. 
https://china.embassy.gov.au/bjng/130716ecoandtrade.html. 
Baldwin, David A. Economic Statecraft. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 
1985. 
Barones, Salvatore. “Bullied by Beijing, America’s Closest Allies Regret Saying ‘Yes’ to 
China.” Foreign Policy (blog). Accessed July 14, 2020. 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/27/china-bullying-australia-new-zealand-
canada-britain-trump/. 
Calmes, Jackie. “A U.S. Marine Base for Australia Irritates China.” The New York Times, 
November 16, 2011, sec. World. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/obama-and-gillard-expand-us-
australia-military-ties.html. 
“The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs,” 2014. Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1215680.shtml 
Chan, Lai-Hai. “Can Australia Flatten the Curve of Its Economic Dependence on China?” 
Accessed August 26, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/can-australia-flatten-
the-curve-of-its-economic-dependence-on-china/. 
Chen, Qimao. “New Approaches in China’s Foreign Policy: The Post-Cold War Era.” 
Asian Survey 33, no. 3 (March 1, 1993): 237–51. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645249. 
“China - Korea Archives.” PacForum. Accessed September 3, 2020. 
http://cc.pacforum.org/relations/china-korea/. 
China Power Team. “How Are Global Views on China Trending?” Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, February 15, 2016. http://chinapower.csis.org/global-
views/. 
62 
Chung, Jae Ho. “East Asia Responds to the Rise of China: Patterns and Variations.” 
Pacific Affairs 82, no. 4 (December 1, 2009): 657–75. 
https://doi.org/10.5509/2009824657. 
Copeland, Dale C. Economic Interdependence and War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2014. 
“Country Analysis | WITS | Visualization.” Accessed August 23, 2020. 
http://wits.worldbank.org/visualization/country-analysis-visualization.html. 
De Castro, Renato Cruz. “Facing Up to China’s Realpolitik Approach in the South China 
Sea Dispute: The Case of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal Stand-off and Its 
Aftermath.” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3, no. 2 (2016): 
157–182. https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797016645452. 
Drezner, Daniel W. The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International 
Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
Feigenbaum, Evan A. “Is Coercion the New Normal in China’s Economic Statecraft?” 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2017. 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/07/25/is-coercion-new-normal-in-china-s-
economic-statecraft-pub-72632. 
OECD. “Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) - FDI Flows—OECD Data.” Accessed June 7, 
2020. http://data.oecd.org/fdi/fdi-flows.htm. 
Gill, Bates, and Linda Jakobson. China Matters: Getting It Right for Australia. 
Collingwood, Australia: Schwartz Publishing, 2017. 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=4741049. 
Glaser, Bonnie S., and Lisa Collins. “China’s Rapprochement With South Korea.” 
Foreign Affairs, November 28, 2017. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-07/chinas-rapprochement-
south-korea. 
Glosserman, Brad. “Seoul Draws Wrong THAAD Lessons.” The Japan Times, January 
27, 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/01/27/commentary/japan-
commentary/seoul-draws-wrong-thaad-lessons/. 
Goldsmith, Benjamin E. “A Liberal Peace in Asia?” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 1 
(2007): 5–27. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307072427. 
Hanson, Fergus, Emilia Currey, and Tracy Beattie. “The Chinese Communist Party’s 
Coercive Diplomacy.” Policy Brief. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020. 
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/chinese-communist-partys-coercive-diplomacy. 
63 
Harrell, Peter, Elisabeth Rosenberg, and Edoardo Sarvalle. “China’s Use of Coercive 
Economic Measures.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 
2018. 
He, Baogang. “Politics of Accommodation of the Rise of China: The Case of Australia.” 
Journal of Contemporary China 21, no. 73 (January 2012): 53–70. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2012.627666. 
He, Kai. “Contested Regional Orders and Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific.” 
International Politics 52, no. 2 (February 2015): 208–22. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2014.46. 
Huisken, Ron. “CSCAP Regional Security Outlook.” Council for Security Cooperation in 
the Asia Pacific, 2019. http://www.cscap.org/uploads/cscap%202020%20v3.pdf. 
Hurst, Daniel. “How Much Is China’s Trade War Really Costing Australia?” The 
Guardian, October 28, 2020, sec. Australia news. 
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/oct/28/how-much-is-chinas-
trade-war-really-costing-australia. 
Information Office of the State Council. “China’s Peaceful Development.” Beijing: The 
People’s Republic of China, 2011. 
Kenneth Boutin, J. D. “Beyond Interdependence: Economic Security and Sino-American-
Australian Trilateralism.” International Journal 70, no. 3 (2015): 372–390. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702015586187. 
Kim, Ellen, and Victor Cha. “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: South Korea’s Strategic 
Dilemmas with China and the United States.” Asia Policy, no. 21 (2016): 101–
121. 
Kim, M.-h. “South Koreas Strategy toward a Rising China, Security Dynamics in East 
Asia, and International Relations Theory.” Asian Survey 56, no. 4 (August 1, 
2016): 707–30. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2016.56.4.707. 
Leon, David Pak Yue. “Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Situating 
China’s Economic and Military Rise.” Asian Politics & Policy 9, no. 1 (2017): 9–
30. https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12300. 
Lim, Darren J. “Chinese Economic Coercion during the THAAD Dispute | The Asan 
Forum.” Accessed September 6, 2020. http://www.theasanforum.org/chinese-
economic-coercion-during-the-thaad-dispute/. 
McDonnell, Stephan, and Helen Brown. “China, Indonesia Wary of US Troops in 
Darwin.” ABC News, November 16, 2011. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-
11-17/china-indonesia-wary-of-us-troops-in-darwin/3675866. 
64 
Medcalf, Rory. “Australia And China: Understanding the Reality Check.” Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 73, no. 2 (March 4, 2019): 109–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2018.1538315. 
Nephew, Richard. “China and Economic Sanctions: Where Does Washington Have 
Leverage?” Brookings (blog), September 30, 2019. 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/china-and-economic-sanctions-where-does-
washington-have-leverage/. 
Norris, William J. Chinese Economic Statecraft Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and 
State Control. Ithaca, New York; Cornell University Press, 2016. 
Reilly, J. “Counting On China? Australia’s Strategic Response to Economic 
Interdependence.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 5, no. 4 
(December 1, 2012): 369–94. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pos016. 
Reilly, James. “China’s Unilateral Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 4 
(October 2012): 121–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.726428. 
Russett, Bruce M. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International 
Organizations. New York: Norton, 2001. 
Schrader, Matt. “A Framework for Understanding Chinese Political Interference in 
Democratic Countries.” Alliance for Securing Democracy, April 2020, 30. 
https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/friends-and-enemies-a-framework-for-
understanding-chinese-political-interference-in-democratic-countries/. 
Searight, Amy. “Countering China’s Influence Operations: Lessons from Australia.” 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2020. 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/countering-chinas-influence-operations-lessons-
australia. 
State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. China’s National 
Defense in the New Era. First., 2019. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/specials/whitepaperonnationaldefenseinnewera.pdf. 
Talmadge, Caitlin. “The US-China Nuclear Relationship: Why Competition Is Likely to 
Intensify.” Brookings (blog), September 30, 2019. 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/china-and-nuclear-weapons/. 
Teng, Jianqun. “Why Is China Unhappy with the Deployment of THAAD in the ROK?” 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2015. 
http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2015-04/01/content_7793314.html. 
The White House. “Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament.” 
whitehouse.gov, November 17, 2011. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament. 
65 
Thomas, Nicholas. “The Economics of Power Transitions: Australia between China and 
the United States.” Journal of Contemporary China 24, no. 95 (September 3, 
2015): 846–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1013376. 
Tønnesson, Stein. “Deterrence, Interdependence and Sino–US Peace.” International Area 
Studies Review 18, no. 3 (September 1, 2015): 297–311. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865915596660. 
Weede, Erich. “The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: Establishing Global Harmony 
by Economic Interdependence.” International Interactions 36, no. 2 (May 24, 
2010): 206–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050621003785181. 
White, Hugh. The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power. Oxford: University 
Press, 2013. 
Yunling, Zhang, and Tang Shiping. “China’s Regional Strategy.” In Power Shift: China 
and Asia’s New Dynamics, 48–68. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
2019. https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520939028-006. 
Zhang, Feng. “Chinese Visions of the Asian Political-Security Order.” Asia Policy 25, 
no. 2 (2018): 13–18. https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2018.0017. 
Zhang, Ketian. “Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing’s Use of Coercion in 
the South China Sea.” International Security 44, no. 1 (August 5, 2019): 117–59. 
Zheng Bijian. “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status.” Foreign Affairs, 2005. 
66 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
67 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
